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Abstract
This thesis consists of three related papers. The first paper examines whether
informal sector jobs are a source of training for young less-educated workers.
Controlling for worker and job characteristics, it is found that in the early years
of workers’ careers in Mexico, wage growth in the informal sector is higher than
in the formal sector. This result is consistent with general human capital in-
vestment on-the-job if the informal labor market is more competitive than the
formal labor market due to frictions generated by labor regulations. These
results motivate a deeper analysis of the informal labor market which is pre-
sented in the second paper.
The second paper examines two roles that informal sector jobs play in the
early stages of a worker’s career: informal jobs may (i) provide the opportunity
to accumulate skills, and (ii) act as a screening device that enables employers to
learn a worker’s ability. This paper develops a matching model of the informal
and formal sectors that can accommodate both roles. Implied hazard rates from
informal to formal sectors as a function of tenure are shown to differ depending
on whether the role of informal sector jobs is human capital accumulation or
screening. Using the ENOE, a longitudinal employment survey from Mexico,
hazard functions are estimated for less-educated workers. The estimated haz-
ard functions suggest the informal sector plays an important role by screening
less-educated workers in the early stages of their careers. The estimation re-
sults also imply that employers would only learn the ability of 14% of their
workers after one month of employment. This finding suggests that employers’
iii
capacity to select workers is limited in government employment programs re-
quiring employers to provide permanent positions to a predetermined fraction
of workers after a short period of time.
The duration data used for estimation in the second paper is obtained from
the stock of individuals employed in the informal sector at a given point in
time. It is known that duration data obtained from a given stock of individuals
can fail to observe those with relatively short spells. Accounting for this sam-
ple bias requires constructing a conditional likelihood function, which in turn
requires knowledge of the exact starting times of each spell. Unfortunately, it
is common in duration data to have coarse measures for starting times, com-
plicating the resolution of sampling bias. The third paper investigates several
alternatives for overcoming coarseness by imputing interval-censored starting
times and performing a Monte Carlo analysis. The results indicate that im-
puted interval midpoints outperform the alternatives.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The term informality means different things to
different people, but almost always bad things
Maloney and Saavedra-Chanduvi (2007)
This dissertation is composed of three related papers. The first two papers,
presented in Chapters 2 and 3, study the role of informal jobs over the career
of less-educated workers. The third paper, presented in Chapter 4, studies the
properties of the estimators used in Chapter 3.
An informal job is a job that does not comply with labor regulations. As
such, these jobs constitute what is typically known as the informal sector. Its
counterpart, the formal sector, is composed of jobs that comply with labor reg-
ulations. These regulations, such as minimum wage, health insurance, sever-
ance payment, or retirement pension, are mainly intended to protect workers,
2and it is commonly argued that observance of these mandates is of great sig-
nificance in developing countries to ensure social justice for workers (Berg and
Kucera, 2008) and to protect them against the forces of reallocation in the labor
market (Inter-American Development Bank, 2003). On the other hand, labor
regulations raise labor costs, and so there is an incentive for employers not to
comply. Similarly, individual workers may prefer a more direct compensation
as opposed to the indirect protection offered by regulations. Furthermore, it
is usually the case that developing countries have low levels of enforcement of
these regulations. As a result, a mass of informal sector jobs emerge; and this
jobs become the main source of employment for certain groups of the popula-
tion, such as the group of young less-educated workers.
Given the importance of informal sector jobs for the employment of young
less-educated workers, it is natural to try to learn more about the work expe-
riences of this group in the informal sector. Chapter 2 provides an initial step
to better understand the effects of informal jobs in the careers of less-educated
workers. Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that for the group of
less-educated workers, wage growth is higher in the informal than in the for-
mal sector, once controlling for worker and job observable characteristics. This
result is consistent with theories of human capital accumulation for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the labor market in the informal sector is more competitive
than the labor market in the formal sector. Second, in any competitive labor
market, workers bear the cost of training and get wage returns (Becker, 1993).
3Third, in a frictional labor market, employers benefit from workers’ training
and are willing to sponsor at least part of the cost of training (Acemoglu and
Pischke, 1999). As a result, one might expect informal sector workers to have
faster wage growth than formal sector workers. These results indicate that it is
possible that informal sector jobs represent a source of training for young-less
educated workers in Mexico.
Chapter 3 further explores the results of Chapter 2. The goal of this chap-
ter is to determine if working in the informal sector can improve the career
prospects of less-educated workers. To that end, this chapter considers two
mechanisms through which informal jobs may positively affect the careers
of less-educated workers. The first mechanism has informal sector jobs pro-
viding training opportunities for young less-educated workers. The second
mechanism has informal sector jobs helping to resolve an information problem
about the initially unobserved skills of young less-educated workers. These two
mechanisms are separately incorporated into a matching model and testable
implications are derived. The matching model developed in this paper fol-
lows the model proposed by Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2006, 2009). The
testable implications are based on the shapes of the hazard function from the
informal to the formal sector. Each of the two proposed mechanisms implies
different shapes for this function. A flexible hazard function is estimated using
data from Mexico, and the estimated hazard is consistent with the implications
of the second mechanism in which informal sector jobs have the function of a
4screening device that helps to resolve the information problem about the ini-
tially unknown skills of young less-educated workers. It is important to men-
tion that this result does not rule out the possibility that informal jobs also
provide training to young less-educated workers.
The estimation of the hazard function in Chapter 3 required employment
duration data in which is necessary to know both the lengths of the job spells
and the starting dates of these spells. However, in the duration data available
for estimation, some of the job spells have a coarser measure of the starting
dates. In particular, for some job spells, the starting date is only known within
a year, and so the starting date of the job spell is only known to be contained in
an interval. As a consequence, the estimation procedure suggested in the liter-
ature (e.g. Klein and Moeschberger, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002) cannot be directly
implemented. Chapter 4 explores the finite sample properties of estimates of
the hazard function using the estimation procedure typically suggested in the
literature, but replacing the missing starting dates of the job spells with im-
puted starting dates. Three imputation methods are proposed, using: (i) the
lower bound of the interval, (ii) the midpoint of the interval, and (iii) the up-
per bound of the interval containing the starting date. A Monte Carlo analysis
is performed, and the results indicate that using the midpoint of the interval
outperforms the alternatives, particularly when the duration data has features
similar to those of the duration data used for estimation in Chapter 3.
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7Chapter 2
Informal Labor Markets and
On-the-Job Training: Evidence
from Wage Data
2.1 Introduction
This paper explores the role of informal jobs in the formation of human capital
among young less-educated workers. An informal job is a job that does not
comply with labor regulations. As such, these jobs constitute what is typically
known as the informal sector. Traditionally, the informal sector is regarded as
the last resort for many workers rationed out of the protected and better paid
jobs in the formal sector (e.g. Ozorio de Almeida, Alves, and Graham, 1995),
or as the disadvantaged sector in a segmented labor market (e.g. Harris and
Todaro, 1970).
This traditional view of the informal sector, however, has been recently chal-
lenged by some authors. One example is Maloney (1999). Based on the analysis
8of patterns of worker mobility across different sectors of employment, Maloney
argues that the existence of an informal labor market in Mexico is not con-
sistent with segmentation in the labor market. Instead, Maloney argues that
some workers may be attracted to informal jobs because of their greater flex-
ibility or possibilities for training. Another example is Amaral and Quintin
(2006). Following a theoretical approach, Amaral and Quintin show that some
of the differences between the formal and informal sectors that are typically
interpreted as evidence of barriers of entry into the formal sector, can be an
equilibrium outcome in a competitive labor market.
More recently, Arias and Khamis (2008) apply the methods developed in
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) for models with essential heterogeneity
to examine the links between earnings performance and the choice of a formal-
salaried job, an informal-salaried job, or self-employment.1 These methods al-
low Arias and Khamis to account for individuals’ observable and unobserv-
able characteristics that influence their decisions to take jobs in one of these
sectors. Their results indicate that there is little difference in the earnings
of formal-salaried workers and self-employed workers once sorting of workers
based on preferences and the returns to their observed and unobserved skills
are fully accounted for in the estimation, which is consistent with workers
choosing jobs based on their comparative advantages. In contrast, their es-
timates suggest a clear advantage both for self-employed and formal-salaried
1Models with essential heterogeneity are models where responses to interventions are het-
erogeneous and agents adopt treatments (participate in programs) with at least partial knowl-
edge of their idiosyncratic response.
9workers over informal-salaried workers, which is more consistent with the ra-
tioning of formal-salaried jobs and with segmentation in the labor market.
The results from household surveys provided by Arias and Maloney (2007)
seem to suggest that informal-salaried workers are rationed out of the bet-
ter paid formal-salaried jobs. Arias and Maloney provide results from house-
hold surveys in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic that
ask employed individuals for the reasons and motivations for taking their cur-
rent jobs. The results indicate that a substantially higher fraction of informal-
salaried workers claimed to have opted for their current job “because they could
not find another job,” than the fraction of formal-salaried workers (see Table 2.9
of Arias and Maloney, 2007).
Despite this ongoing debate, informal jobs seem to play an important role in
the work lives of less-educated workers. Maloney (1999) claims that informal-
salaried jobs serve as the main point of entry for young poorly educated work-
ers into paid employment. Following Maloney, this paper focuses on the group
of young less-educated workers in Mexico and on their experience in the in-
formal sector. The paper explores the extent to which less-educated workers
in the informal sector experience wage growth and how wage growth in the
informal sector compares with wage growth in the formal sector. The basic
question is whether informal jobs offer wage growth and skill accumulation to
less-educated workers, and how it compares with formal jobs.
The empirical analysis uses an employment survey fromMexico, the ENEU.
10
The panel structure of the survey allows for the construction of measures of
wage growth and continuing sector participation. The results indicate that
young less-educated workers in the informal sector experience faster wage
growth than their peers in the formal sector. Based on existing models of on-
the-job training (Becker, 1993; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999), this result sug-
gests that informal jobs offer valuable general training opportunities to young
less-educated workers.
The literature provides little evidence on wage growth in the informal sector
or on how it compares with wage growth in the formal sector. There is some
evidence on the wage gain (or loss) from informality. For example, Maloney
(1999) and Alcaraz, Chiquiar, and Ramos-Francia (2011) provide estimates of
the wage change associated with transitions between the formal and informal
sectors in Mexico. The results in both studies indicate that informal-to-formal
transitions are associated with positive wage changes, while transitions in the
opposite direction are associated with negative wage changes. However, none of
these two studies provide evidence on wage growth experienced by workers in
the informal sector or how it compares to wage growth in the formal sector. The
present study contributes to the literature on the informal sector by providing
evidence and some suggestive ideas of the mechanisms behind these results.
The study is organized as follows. The following section presents the house-
hold survey used in this study and describes the sample and the criteria used
to classify employed respondents as formal or informal sector workers. Next,
11
evidence from wage data is presented in Section 2.3 and the economic interpre-
tations of this evidence are presented in Section 2.4. The last section concludes
and discusses future research.
2.2 Data: The ENEU
The empirical analysis is based on data obtained from the Mexican National
Survey of Urban Employment, ENEU (its acronym in Spanish). The ENEU is
a rotating panel in which households are followed for 12 months, with periodic
visits every three months. Consequently, 20% of the sample is replaced every
quarter. The empirical analysis in this paper uses data from the third quarter
of 1994 to the fourth quarter of 2002; during this period, it is possible to identify
30 different panels, each composed of about 50,000 individuals.
The survey collects information for each individual in the household (e.g.
education, sex, position in the family, etc.), and for individuals aged 12 or older,
the survey also collects information about their working status and character-
istics of their main and secondary jobs. The information on working hours,
earnings, benefits, firm size, job position, and industry of occupation refer to
the job that the individual held the week prior to the interview. In cases in
which the respondent was temporarily absent from work during the week prior
to the interview, some information is still collected, but that information does
not correspond to the week of reference.2 As explained in Appendix A.1, this
2In some cases, the respondent claims to have a job, but to be absent from work during the
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information is used to impute wage data, when this information is missing.
During the period of observation, 47% of all respondents weremales. Among
the male respondents, about 15% are between the ages of 16 and 20 years (see
Figure 2.1), and the average level of education is just below the mandatory
level in Mexico, which is grade 9. Figure 2.2 reveals that 34% of males ages 16
to 65 completed primary school (grade 6) and no more; 32% completed middle
school (grade 9) and no more; and 16% completed high school but did not go
on. About 75% of the male respondents are employees, including salaried and
piece-rate workers (see Figure 2.3).
2.2.1 The Sample
The analysis is restricted to males because men and women may have different
reasons for opting for a formal or informal job. In particular, one of the most
cited reasons by women for choosing an informal-salaried job is the flexibility to
work and perform their family duties (Arias and Maloney, 2007). Additionally,
the sample only includes salaried and piece-rate workers, not self-employed
or employers. However, as Figure 2.4 indicates, 93% of the male respondents
between the ages of 16 and 20 are either salaried or piece-rate workers, so the
vast majority of the respondents in the age group of interest are employees.
Moreover, the sample is restricted to individuals who are salaried or piece-rate
workers for the whole time that they are in the survey.
week previous to the interview. This absence from work could be a result of the respondent to
be on vacation, on sickness or recovery, or on strike, among other reasons.
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To focus on young workers, the sample only includes individuals of ages 16
to 20 inclusive. As explained below, at age 20, transitions between the formal
and informal sectors seem to slow down, and so this age is chosen as the upper
bound for the sample (see Figure 2.6). On the other hand, age 16 is chosen as
the lower bound because of the restrictions imposed by the labor legislation in
Mexico.3 To focus on less-educated individuals, the sample only includes indi-
viduals who are not enrolled in school and completed at most the mandatory
level of education in Mexico (grade 9).
The sample includes both full-time and part-time workers, although the
vast majority of individuals in the sample worked full time. In the sample,
5.56% worked less than 35 hours per week, 68.18% worked between 35 and 48
hours per week, and 26.25% worked more than 48 hours per week.
Finally, the top and bottom 1% of the real hourly earnings are dropped from
the sample. The top and bottom percentiles are generated within groups of
quarter-year-education, hence there is a different top and bottom percentile for
different education levels, on each quarter-year combination.
3Article 123-Section III of theMexican Constitution prohibits the employment of individuals
younger than 14 years of age; and for individuals of 14 and 15 years of age it states a maximum
of 6 hours of work per day (Constitutional Congress, 1917). Similarly, Article 22 of the Federal
Labor Law prohibits employment under 14 years of age, but also the employment of individuals
14 and 15 years of age that have not yet finished the mandatory level of education, which is
middle school (Congress, 1970).
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2.2.2 Identification of Informal Sector Workers
How is an informal sector worker identified in the sample? In Mexico, labor
legislation mandates that all employers register their workers in the Mexican
Institute of Social Security, IMSS (its acronym in Spanish).4 This institution
provides a bundle of benefits to registered workers, including: health insur-
ance, day-care services for children, life insurance, disability pensions, work-
risk pensions, sports and cultural facilities, retirement pensions, and housing
loans (Levy, 2007). Because both the employer and the worker contribute to
the IMSS fees, they are motivated not to register or be registered.5
Among employees, IMSS is the largest institution providing health insur-
ance. However, there are other institutions providing benefits similar to those
of IMSS. One of these institutions is ISSSTE, which provides a bundle of ser-
vices to state employees, including health insurance. As a result, in Mexico,
it is usually said that IMSS or ISSSTE is a benefit associated with one’s job.
If a worker declares to have health insurance provided by IMSS or ISSSTE,
it means that such a worker is a registered worker, and that his or her job
abides by the labor regulations. For this reason, the current study uses health
insurance provided by IMSS or ISSSTE as the distinguishing feature of formal
4Article 123-Section XXIX of the Mexican Constitution states that the Law of Social Secu-
rity is to the public benefit (Constitutional Congress, 1917). And Article 15-Section I of the
Law of Social Security states that every employer must register their employees in the IMSS
(Congress, 1995).
5The labor law mandates that if the worker earns less than three minimum wages, only
the employer pay IMSS fees, but if the worker earns more than three minimum wages, both
employer and worker pay these fees.
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sector workers, or the lack of it as a distinguishing feature of informal sector
workers.
The ENEU’s questionnaire asks respondents for the benefits they get from
their jobs. The questionnaire provides a list of benefits that the respondent can
check. Among these benefits are: IMSS, ISSSTE, paid vacations, Christmas
bonus, and private health insurance or other medical services.6 The respondent
can check more than one benefit. For example, a respondent can check both
IMSS and “private health insurance or other medical services,” which means
that the worker is registered in the IMSS, but that also has private health
insurance provided by the employer. In this case, the respondent can either use
the medical services provided by IMSS or those provided by the private health
insurance, or complement the medical services of the private health insurance
with those of IMSS, or viceversa.
For the purpose of identifying informal sector workers, this study classifies
a respondent as an informal sector worker if the respondent is an employee and
neither IMSS nor ISSSTE is checked as an employee benefit. If the respondent
checks “private health insurance or other medical services,” but neither IMSS
nor ISSSTE is checked, the respondent will be classified as an informal sector
worker.
It is important to mention that in the questionnaire’s option “private health
insurance or other medical services,” among the “other medical services” are
6See question 7d in the ENEU’s questionnaire which can be found at
http://www.inegi.org.mx/.
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the medical services for the military and PEMEX employees.7 As a conse-
quence, the algorithm used in this study to classify workers as informal will
classify military and PEMEX employees as informal sector workers, when in
fact they are formal sector workers. The proportion of respondents in the sam-
ple that does not check IMSS but checks the option of “private health insurance
or other medical services,” is 2.38%. Hence, the algorithm incorrectly classifies
workers as informal in less than 2.38% in the sample.
Figure 2.5 shows the number of workers employed in the formal and the
informal sectors by age at the time of the first interview. Notice that, for ages
16 and 17, the majority of less-educated workers are employed in the informal
sector, and that for older ages the proportion of workers employed in the formal
sector increases. This suggests that, as less-educated workers grow older, they
move from the informal into the formal sector.
In fact, Figure 2.6 shows that the likelihood of moving from the informal
into the formal sector increases during the first years of the workers’ careers.
The likelihood of moving in the opposite direction decreases monotonically, sug-
gesting that many workers make the transition from the informal to the formal
sector, but as they age, the likelihood that these workers move back to the in-
formal sector decreases. This patten of transitions between these two salaried
sectors suggests that young informal-sector workers may expect to eventually
move to the formal sector.
7PEMEX is the Mexican state-owned petroleum company.
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2.3 Evidence from Wage Data
Figure 2.7 presents the kernel density of the log wages of workers in the formal-
salaried and informal-salaried sectors in the sample. The kernel densities in
the figure are consistent with Arias (2007), who finds that informal-salaried
workers have an earnings disadvantage with respect to formal-salaried work-
ers at all points of the pay scale in the case of Argentina and Bolivia. Figure
2.7 suggests that this earnings disadvantage also seems to hold for the case of
young less-educated workers in Mexico.
Figure 2.8 presents the evolution of average hourly earnings in the formal
and informal sectors during the period of observation. Hourly earnings are in
Mexican Pesos of the second half of June 2002. Notice that, during the first
periods of observation, hourly earnings fell significantly due to the so-called
Tequila crisis. These two series also reflect the greater flexibility in adjusting
wages in the informal sector. Both series reach a minimum at the third quarter
of 1996, but the loss in hourly earnings in the formal sector is 28%, whereas,
in the informal sector, it is 40%. In addition, the growth in hourly earnings
between the third quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter of 2002 is 41% in
the formal sector and 56% in the informal sector. Finally, notice that despite
the differences in flexibility in adjusting wages in each sector, both series tend
to move together, suggesting that they react similarly to changes in economic
conditions.
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Now, consider individual wages. Table 2.1 presents log-wage regressions
for each salaried sector on a set of worker and firm observable characteristics.
Most of the estimated coefficients have the expected sign. In both sectors, being
a middle-school graduate is much better than only being primary-school grad-
uate, however, the correlation between wages and graduation is stronger in
the informal sector, which suggests that for the kind of jobs that less-educated
workers access in each sector, skills are more important in the informal sector
than in the formal sector. Work experience is positively correlated with wages,
as expected.8 However, given the range of ages, there is not too much curva-
ture in this relationship, hence experience squared is not significant and was
not included in the regression. Noticeably, local unemployment has a negative
relation with wages in the formal sector, but not in the informal sector.
Notice that industry and firm size are important in explaining wages in
both sectors. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the distribution of workers in the sam-
ple among firms of different sizes and among different industries. Figure 2.9
indicates that formal-salaried workers in the sample are mostly employed in
firms with more than 250 employees, whereas, informal-salaried workers are
mostly employed in firms with 2 to 5 employees. The fact that some informal-
salaried workers are employed in firms with more than 250 employees reveals
the well known practice of some firms hiring part of their labor force infor-
mally.9 In such cases, it is typical for the transition from informal to formal to
8Experience is computed as min{A− E − 6, A− 16}, A =Age, E =Education.
9Even though this is a suggestion, it would be very hard to imagine a firm with more than
250 employees and all of them hired informally. In such a case, it would be hard for the
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occur within the same firm. Similarly, Figure 2.10 indicates that the majority
of young less-educated workers employed formally work in the manufacturing
industry. Also, notice that the fraction of workers employed in construction and
in services is higher in the informal sector.
Now, consider wage growth. Figure 2.11 shows the kernel density of wage
growth in the sample. For both, one-quarter and two-quarter wage growth,
wage changes in both sectors are symmetric around 0, but wage growth in the
informal sector is more disperse than wage growth in the formal sector. The
higher dispersion of wage growth is consistent with the higher flexibility in
adjusting wages in the formal sector mentioned above.
Equally important, consider wage growth conditional on worker and firm
characteristics. How does individual wage growth in the formal sector compare
to wage growth in the informal sector? This relation is explored by estimating
the following wage growth equation:
∆ lnwit = βISi + x
′
itγ + ξit (2.1)
where the time index is defined in quarters, ∆ lnwit = (lnwit − lnwit−1), ISi is a
dummy for informal-sector participation in two consecutive quarters, and xit is
a set of covariates such as those included in the low-wage regressions presented
in Table 2.1. The sample used to estimate equation (2.1) only includes workers
that are either in the informal sector for two consecutive quarters or are in the
formal sector for two consecutive quarters.
employer to stay below the radar of authorities.
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The parameter of interest is β, which indicates how wage growth of an in-
dividual employed in the informal sector compares to wage growth of an indi-
vidual employed in the formal sector with similar xit characteristics. Table 2.2
presents the results from estimation of (2.1) for different sets of covariates.
First, consider differences in raw wage growth when xit only includes an
intercept. In this case, presented in Column (A) of Table 2.2, the regression re-
sults indicate that wage growth in the formal sector is similar to wage growth
in the informal sector. Next, consider differences in wage growth when xit in-
cludes worker observable characteristics, presented in Column (B). The results
indicate that conditioning on education and experience yields the same conclu-
sion. Neither graduation from primary nor secondary school seem to have a
significant effect on wage growth. This suggests that educational attainment
does not appear to affect wage growth for these workers. Similarly, the effect
of experience on wage growth is insignificant.
As Figure 2.8 suggests, it is important to control for different economic con-
ditions over time. To control for these factors, Column (C) presents estimation
results including the level of local unemployment and a time trend. Both of
theses covariates have significant relationships with wage growth. However,
wage growth difference between the two sectors is still insignificant. The es-
timates indicate that workers in places with higher local unemployment expe-
rience lower wage growth. The time trend is intended to capture changes in
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economic conditions that affect both sectors. As Figure 2.8 suggests, the eco-
nomic environment seemed to improve for most of the period of observation.
This improvement is reflected in the positive estimate for the time trend.
Finally, Column (D) also controls for characteristics of the firm where the
worker is employed by including industry and firm size indicators. The re-
sults indicate that industry and firm size are important determinants of wage
growth. Furthermore, when controlling for these firm characteristics, the dif-
ference in wage growth between the formal and informal sectors becomes posi-
tive and significant, indicating that wage growth is faster in the informal sector
than in the formal sector.
Industry and firm size indicators are intended to control for differences in
firm productivity. If firms of different sizes, or operating in different industries,
are systematically different with respect to productivity, then these differences
in productivity may lead to differences in wage growth as well as wage levels.
One could argue that the larger the firm is, the more productive it is, for exam-
ple, because larger firms invest more in technology than small firms, and that
firms using more technology may require more worker training which will re-
sult in higher wage growth. Similarly, one could argue that firms in industries
with higher capital to labor ratio could systematically be more productive than
firms in other industries.
Recall that formal sector workers are mostly employed in large firms, whereas
informal sector workers are mostly employed in small and medium-size firms
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(see Figure 2.9). Similarly, the fraction of workers employed in the manufactur-
ing and commerce industries is higher among formal sector workers, whereas,
the fraction of workers employed in the construction and services industries is
higher among informal sector workers (see Figure 2.10).
Table 2.3 breaks down the estimation of the wage growth equation by indus-
try and by firm size. The numbers in the table give, for different specifications,
the estimate of β in equation (2.1), which is the coefficient of the indicator of
informal-sector participation in two consecutive quarters, ISi. The first column
indicates that, irrespective of industry, in medium-size firms, informal sector
workers experience faster wage growth than formal sector workers, however,
the difference in wage growth is not statistically significant for any other firm
size. The last two lines indicate that, irrespective of firm size, in the construc-
tion and in the services industries, formal sector workers experience faster
wage growth than informal sector workers. Breaking down the estimation by
industry and firm size, the results indicate that in small and medium-size firms
(6 to 10 and 15 to 60 employees), informal sector workers experience faster
wage growth than formal sector workers in the construction and service indus-
tries.
Notice that none of these specifications control for occupation. It is also pos-
sible that less-educated workers in small informal-sector firms are employed in
more productive occupations, say mason’s apprentice, than less-educated work-
ers employed in small formal-sector firms, say messenger or clerk. Also, recall
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that the log-wage equations presented in Table 2.1 suggest that for the kind
of jobs that less-educated workers access in each sector, skills seem to be more
important in the informal sector. Hence, one might expect wages to grow faster
with the acquisition of new skills for less-educated workers in the informal
sector than for their peers in the formal sector.
A similar wage growth equation was estimated with ∆2 lnwit = (lnwit −
lnwit−2) and so the indicator ISi is a dummy for sector participation in three
consecutive quarters. Now, the sample used to estimate equation (2.1) only
includes workers that are either in the informal sector for three consecutive
quarters or are in the formal sector for three consecutive quarters. Table 2.4
presents the estimation results for this specification. Overall, the results and
the conclusions are very similar to the one-quarter wage growth: conditional on
worker and firm observable characteristics, wages in the informal sector grow
faster than wages in the formal sector.
Finally, notice that in all specifications of Tables 2.2 and 2.4, the R2 is very
small, and so a large portion of the variation in wage growth is not explained
by the covariates included in the regression. If the omitted variables are sys-
tematically correlated with informal or formal sector participation, then the
indicator for continuous informal sector participation will pick up these corre-
lation.
Similarly, there is no explicit treatment of unobserved heterogeneity or se-
lection, and so the estimates on the indicator of informal sector participation
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could be biased. However, if unobserved heterogeneity, or “ability,” has a simi-
lar effect on wages in two or three consecutive quarters, then its effect should
cancel out when looking at wage growth. Notice that educational achievement
does not have a significant effect on wage growth, and so it seems unlikely that
unobserved heterogeneity would have a crucial role, given the strong correla-
tion between education and unobserved heterogeneity (or ability). With respect
to worker selection, one can easily argue that those workers continuously em-
ployed in the informal sector are negatively selected, and so the estimate of the
coefficient of ISi may be downward biased. In this case, we can consider it as a
lower bound for the true β.
2.4 Economic Interpretations of Evidence
This section argues that this evidence is consistent with general human capital
investment on-the-job.10 First, consider the model of general on-the-job train-
ing in a competitive labor market provided by Becker (1993). In such a labor
market, wages paid by a firm are determined by the productivity in other firms.
Productivity increases with general training equally in the firm providing it as
well as in other firms. Consequently, firms cannot capture any of the returns
from the investment in general training because the worker can move freely
to another firm once training is finished. As a result, workers capture all the
10General training increases a worker’s productivity at any firm. Contrary to firm-specific
training, which increases productivity more in firms providing it. See Becker (1993) chapter
III.
25
returns from that investment and bear the cost of general training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that, if frictions in the labor market re-
sult in a compressed wage structure, firms find it profitable to invest in training,
even when training involves general skills. In a compressed wage structure,
productivity in the current firm increases more with training than in other
firms. Hence, firms’ profits increase with training, as a consequence firms are
willing to sponsor general training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) also provide examples of mechanisms that
produce a compressed wage structure, inducing firms to sponsor general train-
ing. Some of these mechanisms include search frictions that generate job
search costs, asymmetric information about the worker’s ability, complemen-
tarity between firm-specific skills and general skills, and labor market institu-
tions, such as minimum wages and unions. Equally important, Acemoglu and
Pischke show that increasing wage compression leads to more firm-sponsored
training.
The informal labor market is likely to be more competitive than the formal
labor market. This feature of the labor market was exploited by Zenou (2008).
Zenou develops a model of the informal and formal sectors in which the for-
mal labor market is characterized by search frictions, while the informal labor
market is competitive. Equally important are frictions generated by labor insti-
tutions. One of the most cited causes of large informal sectors is the existence
of rigidities in the labor market due to excessive regulation (see Schneider and
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Enste, 2000). This link between labor regulations and the existence of informal
sectors has been studied and documented. For example, Rauch (1991) develops
a model in which the size of the informal sector is directly related to the de-
gree of labor regulation.11 Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) find that the main
driving force behind the increase in informality in Brazil during the 1990s was
the reduction of formal sector hirings mainly explained by changes in labor
market legislation. More recently, Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009) built
an equilibrium search and matching model to study the effects of changes of
severance and payroll taxes; their simulations suggest that increases in both
severance and payroll taxes shift employment from the formal to the informal
sector.
Wage compression in the formal labor market due to frictions implies that
firms reap some of the returns from training and pay at least part of the cost of
training. The informal labor market is more competitive, hence workers reap
the returns from training and bear the cost of training. As a consequence, even
with the same amount of investment on training in both sectors, wage growth
should be faster in the informal sector than in the formal sector.
It is also possible that informal sector workers invest more in human capital
than formal sector workers. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that, on average, wages
in the informal sector are lower than in the formal sector. The difference in
intercepts in the log-wage equations in Table 2.1 suggests that there is still
11Labor regulation in Rauch (1991) is implemented as a minimum wage. Acemoglu and Pis-
chke (1999) argue that this is one of the mechanisms producing a compressed wage structure.
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a gap after controlling for worker and firm observable characteristics. Finally,
Figure 2.6 suggests that, during the first years of the workers’ careers, workers
are more likely to move from the informal to the formal sector as they age. If
wages and productivity are lower in the informal sector and informal sector
workers expect to move to the formal sector eventually, investment in human
capital may be greater in the informal sector than in the formal sector. That
is, if workers face a lower price for their skills in the informal sector in the
present, and expect a higher price for their skills when they move to the formal
sector in the future, then the opportunity cost of human capital investment
is lower in the informal sector, which will induce informal sector workers to
invest more in human capital. Formal sector workers, on the other hand, do
not face this lower opportunity cost.
Faster wage growth in the informal sector could also arise in a model of on-
the-job training with different levels of specificity of training in the formal and
informal sectors. In Becker (1993), when firms provide firm-specific on-the-job
training, firms bear the cost of training because if the worker moves to another
firm, all productivity gains from training will be lost. If most of the training
in the formal sector involves firm-specific human capital, whereas most of the
training in the informal sector involves general human capital, wages in the
informal sector will exhibit greater growth than wages in the formal sector.
28
2.5 Final Remarks
The traditional view of the informal sector assumes that jobs in this sector offer
little beyond a make-shift or temporary job for workers that are waiting for a
“better” formal sector job. However, this study shows that informal jobs are
not dead end jobs, and that these jobs appear to offer wage growth similar to
formal sector jobs for young less-educated workers entering the labor market.
The present study provides an analysis of the informal and formal sectors
using data from 1994 to 2002 from the Mexican National Survey of Urban
Employment, ENEU. The analysis revealed that less-educated workers start
their careers in the informal sector, and move to the formal sector as they grow
older. More important, it is found that for young less-educated workers, wages
in the informal sector grow faster than wages in the formal sector, conditional
on worker and firm observable characteristics.
On the assumption that the labor market in the informal sector is more com-
petitive than its counterpart in the formal sector, models of on-the-job training
in competitive and in non-competitive labor markets predict that formal sec-
tor employers sponsor at least part of the training costs, while informal sector
employers pass these costs onto the workers. The evidence from wage growth
data presented in this paper is consistent with these theories of human capital
accumulation, which, in turn, supports the possibility that young less-educated
workers accumulate skills while employed in the informal sector.
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Informal-salaried workers may even invest more in human capital than
formal-salaried workers. This is because informal-salaried workers have lower
wages and expect to eventually move to a formal-salaried job. Another mecha-
nism consistent with the evidence on wage data is based on systematic differ-
ences in the specificity of training between the informal and the formal sectors.
Even though all these mechanisms lead to the same conclusion in terms of
investment in human capital in the informal sector, they may have different
implications for the design of labor market policies, and so ideally one could
distinguish between them. That exercise would require more than just analyz-
ing wage data.
If informal-salaried jobs do indeed provide provide training to young less-
educated workers, those who start in the informal sector and move to the for-
mal sector later on in their careers, will have a career path different from the
career path of less-educated workers who start in the formal sector. These
differences could be used to distinguish between the proposed mechanisms dis-
cussed above. However, to study these differences, it is necessary to have access
to a longer panel than the one used in this paper, which only follows individuals
during 12 months.
Equally important, if informal jobs provide training opportunities to young
less-educated workers, then it is possible that these workers opt for an informal
job instead of queuing longer for a formal job, in order to accumulate skills.
Given the arguments provided before, it could also be possible that training
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costs could help in closing the gap between earnings in the formal and informal
sectors, which seem to persist after controlling for observable characteristics.
It is true that this study only explores one possible role of the informal
sector in the careers of less-educated workers, human capital accumulation.
However, the informal sector may have other roles. For example, the informal
sector could play the role of a screening device. That is, suppose that when less-
educated workers enter the labor market their abilities are unknown, and so,
to minimize firing costs, formal sector firms refuse to hire them. If the informal
sector offers job opportunities to young less-educated workers, and their ability
is revealed while working there, then formal sector firms could use the worker’s
trajectory in the informal sector to learn the worker’s ability and hire from the
pool of informal sector workers whose ability has been revealed.
Chapter 3 considers two roles of the informal sector: human capital accu-
mulation and screening of workers’ abilities. Based on the implications of a
search and matching model, and on the estimation of the hazard function from
informal to formal sectors, the author concludes that the main role of informal
jobs is to serve as a screening mechanism that solves an information problem
about workers’ abilities. Although this result does not rule out the possibility
of workers accumulating skills in the informal sector it has important impli-
cations for the design of labor market policies directed to the informal labor
market.
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Figure 2.1: Age Distribution in the ENEU
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Source: ENEU 3:1994 - 4:2002. Includes only males ages 12 to 65
Figure 2.2: Education Distribution in the ENEU
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Source: ENEU 3:1994 - 4:2002. Includes only males ages 12 to 65
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Figure 2.3: Job Position Distribution in the ENEU
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Source: ENEU 3:1994 - 4:2002. Includes only males ages 12 to 65
Figure 2.4: Job Position Distribution Ages 16 - 20
employer
self−employed
piece−rate
salaried
Source: ENEU 3:1994 - 4:2002. Includes only males ages 16 to 20
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Figure 2.5: Formal Salaried and Informal Salaried Workers by Age
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Source: ENEU 3:1994-4:2002. Males only, with 0 to 9 years of education and with no
changes in the level of education.
Figure 2.6: Worker Transitions by Age as a Fraction of Initial Sector
4
6
8
10
12
%
20 30 40 50 60 70
age
Formal −−> Informal Informal −−> Formal
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEU. FS = Formal Salaried, IS = Infor-
mal Salaried. Ages 16 to 65.
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Figure 2.7: Kernel Density of Log-Wages in the Sample
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Source: Author’s calculations using ENEU. Includes only males ages 16 to 20 with
education less or equal to 9 years and with no changes in education level.
Figure 2.8: Average Wage over Time by Sector in the Sample
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Source: Author’s calculations using ENEU. Includes only males ages 16 to 20 with
education less or equal to 9 years and with no changes in education level. Hourly
wage in Mexican pesos as in the second-half of June 2002.
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Figure 2.9: Firm Size Distribution in the Sample
(a) Formal Sector
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Source: ENEU 3:1994-4:2002. Includes only males ages 16 to 20 with education less
or equal to 9 years and with no changes in education level.
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Figure 2.10: Industry Distribution in the Sample
(a) Formal Sector
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Source: ENEU 3:1994-4:2002. Includes only males ages 16 to 20 with education less or equal
to 9 years and with no changes in education level.
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Figure 2.11: Kernel Density of Wage Growth in the Sample
(a) One-Quarter
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(b) Two-Quarters
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Source: Author’s calculations using ENEU. Includes only males ages 16 to 20 with
education less or equal to 9 years and with no changes in education level.
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Table 2.1: Log-Wage Regressions by Sector
Informal Sector Formal Sector
Primary School Grad. 0.0759 0.0189
(0.0072) (0.0082)
Middle School Grad. 0.0375 0.0277
(0.0050) (0.0039)
Experience 0.0471 0.0304
(0.0017) (0.0015)
Local Unemployment -0.1861 -1.2361
(0.1375) (0.1161)
Time trend 0.0085 0.0077
(0.0003) (0.0003)
INDUSTRY
Construction 0.0783 0.0503
(0.0073) (0.0082)
Commerce -0.0481 -0.1151
(0.0063) (0.0043)
Services -0.0073 -0.0647
(0.0065) (0.0057)
FIRM SIZE
6-10 0.0873 0.0317
(0.0068) (0.0097)
11-15 0.1315 0.0543
(0.0098) (0.0108)
16-50 0.1150 0.0468
(0.0084) (0.0084)
51-100 0.1116 0.0754
(0.0150) (0.0092)
101-250 0.1092 0.0757
(0.0240) (0.0100)
250+ 0.2019 0.1352
(0.0086) (0.0077)
constant 1.8550 2.1988
(0.0122) (0.0132)
Number of obs. 38904 42880
R2 0.0764 0.0974
NOTES: Primary School Grad.= I{E ≥ 6}, and Middle School Grad.= I{E ≥
9}, where E is years of education. The omitted industry is Manufacturing,
and the Transportation industry was included in the Commerce industry. The
omitted firm size is 2-5 employees. The sample includes males ages 16 to 20
years of age not enrolled in school with 9 or less years of education. Standard
errors of estimates are in parenthesis.
42
Table 2.2: One-Quarter Wage Growth Regressions
(A) (B) (C) (D)
IS -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0045 0.0106
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0058)
Primary School Grad. 0.0008 0.0009 0.0026
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Middle School Grad. 0.0027 0.0014 0.0017
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Experience -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Local Unemployment -0.4233 -0.4059
(0.1225) (0.1230)
Time trend 0.0020 0.0020
(0.0003) (0.0003)
INDUSTRY
Construction 0.0306
(0.0074)
Commerce -0.0036
(0.0050)
Services 0.0057
(0.0057)
FIRM SIZE
6-10 0.0326
(0.0074)
11-15 0.0340
(0.0099)
16-50 0.0302
(0.0077)
51-100 0.0368
(0.0100)
101-250 0.0314
(0.0116)
250+ 0.0359
(0.0069)
constant 0.0190 0.0200 -0.0057 -0.0415
(0.0027) (0.0084) (0.0114) (0.0130)
Number of obs. 44,754 44,754 44,754 44,754
R2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0031 0.0043
NOTES: ISi is and indicator for continuous participation in the informal sector. ISi = 1
if individual participated two consecutive quarters in the informal sector, and ISi = 0 if
the individual participated two consecutive quarters in the formal sector. Primary School
Grad.= I{E ≥ 6}, and Middle School Grad.= I{E ≥ 9}, where E is years of education.
The omitted industry is Manufacturing, and the Transportation industry was included in the
Commerce industry. The omitted firm size is 2-5 employees. The sample includes males ages
16 to 20 years of age not enrolled in school with 9 or less years of education. Standard errors
of estimates are in parenthesis.
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Table 2.3: Wage Growth Regressions: Coefficient of Informal Sector Participa-
tion for Two Consecutive Quarters
Industry
Firm Size All Industries Manufacturing Construction Services Commerce
2-5 0.015 -0.012 -0.040 0.012 0.032
(0.015) (0.030) (0.059) (0.031) (0.023)
6-10 0.004 -0.007 0.024 0.063∗∗ -0.033
(0.014) (0.028) (0.052) (0.031) (0.023)
11-15 0.009 0.010 -0.036 0.000 0.011
(0.018) (0.029) (0.063) (0.054) (0.031)
16-50 0.028∗∗ 0.030 0.076∗ 0.057 -0.013
(0.013) (0.019) (0.041) (0.038) (0.024)
51-100 0.012 0.026 0.044 0.004 -0.026
(0.021) (0.031) (0.059) (0.067) (0.040)
101-250 0.008 0.049 0.005 -0.079 -0.016
(0.036) (0.049) (0.108) (0.118) (0.084)
250+ 0.008 0.018 -0.085 0.009 -0.033
(0.010) (0.029) (0.068) (0.017) (0.029)
All Firm Sizes 0.001 -0.036∗∗ -0.015∗ 0.000
(0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011)
NOTES: All regressions include the same covariates as the regression in column (D) of Table 2.2. Standard
errors of estimates are in parenthesis.
∗∗ Significant at 5%, ∗ Significant at 10%
44
Table 2.4: Two-Quarters Wage Growth Regressions
(A) (B) (C) (D)
IS -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0012 0.0168
(0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0087)
Primary School Grad. -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0065
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Middle School Grad. 0.0110 0.0088 0.0092
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0062)
Experience -0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0020
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Local Unemployment -1.0516 -1.0283
(0.1734) (0.1741)
Time trend 0.0037 0.0037
(0.0004) (0.0004)
INDUSTRY
Construction 0.0255
(0.0108)
Commerce -0.0165
(0.0071)
Services 0.0019
(0.0082)
FIRM SIZE
6-10 0.0289
(0.0109)
11-15 0.0010
(0.0147)
16-50 0.0369
(0.0114)
51-100 0.0365
(0.0146)
101-250 0.0249
(0.0166)
250+ 0.0364
(0.0101)
constant 0.0316 0.0411 0.0035 -0.0276
(0.0039) (0.0126) (0.0167) (0.0191)
Number of obs. 22,839 22,839 22,839 22,839
R2 0.0000 0.0002 0.0121 0.0136
NOTES: ISi is and indicator for continuous participation in the informal sector. ISi = 1
if individual participated three consecutive quarters in the informal sector, and ISi = 0 if
the individual participated three consecutive quarters in the formal sector. Primary School
Grad.= I{E ≥ 6}, and Middle School Grad.= I{E ≥ 9}, where E is years of education.
The omitted industry is Manufacturing, and the Transportation industry was included in the
Commerce industry. The omitted firm size is 2-5 employees. The sample includes males ages
16 to 20 years of age not enrolled in school with 9 or less years of education. Standard errors
of estimates are in parenthesis.
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Chapter 3
The Role of the Informal Sector
in the Early Careers of
Less-Educated Workers
3.1 Introduction
The informal sector is an important feature of labor markets in developing
countries. This sector, composed of all jobs not complying with labor regula-
tions, occupies a significant portion of these countries’ labor markets. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, the fraction of workers employed in the informal
sector ranges from 15% to 62% (see Figure 3.1). Jobs in this sector employ
the majority of young unskilled workers usually paying very low wages, not
to mention the lack of health and employment insurance enjoyed by workers
holding formal sector jobs.
The presence of large informal sectors has typically been a concern for re-
searchers and policymakers. Some are concerned that the informal sector could
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Figure 3.1: Share of Salaried Workers in Informal Jobs in Latin America and
the Caribbean
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Source: Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World
Bank). Data obtained in the fall of 2010. Males and females ages 25-64 in urban areas. Varying
years. A worker is considered informal if (s)he does not have the right to a pension when retired.
be the disadvantaged sector in a segmented labor market market (Magnac,
1991; Maloney, 1999; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Arias and Khamis, 2008).
Others are concerned that the informal sector might adversely affect produc-
tivity and growth (Loayza, 1996; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Farrell, 2004;
Levy, 2007; Fajnzylber, 2007). Whether these concerns are supported by the
evidence is still unresolved. However, they have induced policymakers to in-
troduce tighter regulations to reduce or control the size of the informal sector.
Before attempting to restrict the informal sector, it is important to inves-
tigate the potential benefits that workers obtain during informal sector em-
ployment. Previous studies have found that less-educated workers start their
working careers in salaried jobs in the informal sector and move into formal
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jobs as they grow older (Maloney, 1999; Arias and Maloney, 2007). We would
like to know if informal sector jobs provide some value above and beyond make-
shift low-paying work while people wait to find a “good” formal sector job: do
these jobs also provide skills or help screen workers to facilitate a transition to
higher paying formal sector jobs? If rules designed to reduce the informal sec-
tor are implemented, would we lose some valuable worker training or screen-
ing? If so, restrictions on informal sector employment should be accompanied
by policies that replace the productive functions of these jobs.
We investigate two potential roles that informal sector jobs could play in
the early stages of a worker’s career. First, these jobs may provide the op-
portunity to accumulate skills, making workers more productive and more at-
tractive to formal sector employers. While more-educated workers tend to ac-
cess greater training opportunities in formal sector employment, less-educated
workers may turn to the informal sector to gain work skills.1 Second, informal
sector jobs may serve as a screening device that enables employers to learn a
worker’s ability. The lack of compliance with labor regulations, especially firing
costs and severance payments, suggests that informal sector employers may be
more prone to hire young unskilled workers entering the labor market than are
formal sector employers. Hence, an informal sector worker who reveals that he
is productive may increase his likelihood of finding a formal sector job.
The role of the informal sector as a provider of training opportunities was
1The evidence presented by Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) indicates that more educated
workers in the U.S. have greater access to on-the-job training (see Table 4.2).
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first suggested by Hemmer and Mannel (1989) and has been advocated by Mal-
oney (1999) and Arias and Maloney (2007). The role of the informal sector as
a screening device is rarely discussed. One exception is Arias and Maloney
(2007) who argue that labor regulations and information asymmetries “impede
young workers’ entry into the formal sector.”2 The study presented here con-
tributes to this literature by providing an analytical framework and empirical
evidence about these roles of the informal sector.
To determine the relative importance of the training or screening roles of
the informal sector, we develop a two-sector matching model to study worker
movements from the informal to the formal sector. The model is designed to
better understand the labor market dynamics in Mexico, a country with a sig-
nificant informal labor market. In Mexico, the informal sector is a port of entry
to the labor market for less-educated workers. These workers are concentrated
in the informal sector in the early stages of their working careers, moving to
the formal sector as they age (see Figure 3.2). Figure 3.3 shows that the prob-
ability of moving from the informal to the formal sector increases during the
early stages of workers’ careers.
The empirical analysis is based on the analytical implications for hazard
rates from the informal to the formal sectors derived from the model. It is
shown that hazard rates from informal to formal sectors as a function of tenure
2Bosch (2006) and Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) present evidence that labor regula-
tions affect the patterns of job creation in the formal sector in economies with large informal
sectors. Some argue that these regulations disproportionately affect the youth (World Bank,
2007, chap. 4).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Workers by Employment Sector in Mexico
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Source: Author’s calculations using ENOE I:2005 - IV:2010. A worker is considered informal if he is an employee not
enrolled in government health care program. Males not attending school.
Figure 3.3: Transitions Out of the Informal Sector in Mexico
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Source: Author’s calculations using ENOE I:2005 - IV:2010. Number of transitions relative to the size of the informal
sector. A worker is considered informal if he is an employee not enrolled in government health care program. Males
not attending school. IS = Informal Sector, FS = Formal Sector, SE = Self-Employed.
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differ depending on the role of the informal sector: human capital accumula-
tion or screening. On the one hand, if workers accumulate human capital while
working in the informal sector, the likelihood of moving into the formal sector
increases with informal sector tenure. On the other hand, if workers’ produc-
tivities are screened while working in the informal sector, those discovered as
highly productive move faster to the formal sector, leaving behind those with
low productivity who have difficulties to access formal sector jobs. Thus, the
likelihood of moving into the formal sector may initially increase, but it even-
tually decreases with informal sector tenure.
Using an employment survey from Mexico to obtain measures of duration
of employment in the informal sector, we estimate the hazard functions and
test the two hypotheses. The estimated hazard is consistent with the implica-
tions of the screening model, which indicates that informal sector jobs have an
important role by solving the information problem about the abilities of young
less-educated workers that are new to the labor market.
Our results give us the means to infer the parameters governing the screen-
ing process in one stream of the Be´cate training program for the unemployed
in Mexico, which is targeted at less-educated youth.3 One of the streams of
Be´cate is a mixture of skill formation and worker placement. In this stream,
training takes place at the workplace, and the hosting firm must have empty
3Be´cate was launched in 1984 and was designed to assist individuals with less than 9 years
of education between the ages of 16 and 30. Currently, the program has more streams to
assist a broader set of workers and needs. Delajara, Freije, and Soloaga (2006) provides a
comprehensive evaluation of the program.
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vacancies that need to be filled. The training program lasts for one to three
months. At the end of the training program, the firm is committed to hire at
least 70% of the participants.4 Given this short amount of time, it seems likely
that the program works more as a screening device than a source of significant
skill formation.
Based on the estimated hazard, we can deduce the rate at which an em-
ployer learns about a worker’s ability. For workers with less than 12 years
of education, the estimates indicate that an employer learns about a worker’s
ability at a rate of 14% per month. Consequently, if an employer commits to
hire 70% of the program participants, a one or two month program requires
the employer to take a gamble on a considerable portion of the program par-
ticipants, since the employer must bear the firing costs of terminating any un-
suitable workers. This highlights the importance of better understanding the
role of the informal sector in the design of policy.
The study is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the baseline
model and its implications for hazard rates from the informal to the formal
sector. In Section 3.3, we present models with human capital accumulation
and with employer learning, deriving their implications for hazard rates. Once
the theoretical implications are described, in Section 3.4 we describe the data
used in the empirical analysis. The details of the estimation follow in Section
3.5. Section 3.6 summarizes the empirical results, and Section 3.7 concludes
4In this stream of the program, the firm can participate in the selection and recruitment of
workers participating in the program.
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with some remarks on the results and suggestions for future research.
3.2 Baseline Model
The labor market is composed of two sectors, a formal sector and an informal
sector. Formal sector firms comply with labor regulations represented by a
firing cost incurred by firms when jobs are destroyed. The firing cost is assumed
to be a wasteful tax as in Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) and Dolado, Jansen,
and Jimeno (2005), so no transfer to the worker takes place. Informal sector
firms do not comply with labor regulations.
We follow Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2006, 2009) by assuming that
workers differ in their productivity in the formal sector, but they are equally
productive in the informal sector. Workers in the formal sector produce px
units per period, where p ∈ {pL, pH}, with pH > pL, and x is a measure of match
quality. Match quality is a random draw from a known distribution G(x) with
support on [0, 1] that is made when the worker and firm meet; match quality
stays constant until the job is destroyed. A fraction φ of the workers have the
innate productivity pL in the formal sector; we refer to these workers as L-
skilled and the others as H-skilled. Innate productivity is perfectly observable.
All workers in the informal sector produce pI units per period. It is assumed
that pI ≥ z, where z is the flow utility in unemployment.
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Job destruction in both sectors follows from an idiosyncratic shock that ar-
rives to occupied jobs at Poisson rate δ. If the job is destroyed in the formal
sector, the firm incurs a firing cost D. Jobs are also destroyed due to worker’s
death. A worker dies with probability τ regardless of the worker’s employment
status. Every dead worker is replaced by a new unemployed worker who is L-
skilled with probability φ. Job destructions due to death do not generate firing
costs.
Unemployed workers search for jobs in both sectors, and all informal sector
workers search for jobs in the formal sector.5 The number of meetings between
workers and firms in the informal sector is m(u, vI) and m(u + eI , vF ) in the
formal sector, where u and eI are the number of workers in unemployment
and in informal sector jobs, respectively, vj is the number of open vacancies
in sector j ∈ {F, I}, and m(·, ·) is the meeting function. The meeting function
is homogeneous of degree one, concave and increasing in both its arguments.
As a result, a job seeker meets a firm in sector j ∈ {F, I} with probability
m(θj) = m(1, θj), and a firm in sector j meets a job seeker with probability
m(θj)/θj , where θI = vI/u and θF = vF/(u + eI) are the measures of market
tightness in the informal and the formal labor markets, respectively.
Given the assumptions on productivity in the informal sector, all meetings
between an informal sector firm and an unemployed worker lead to job cre-
ation. Due to firing costs and to the assumptions on productivity in the formal
5To focus on flows from the informal to the formal sector, we abstract from on-the-job search
in the opposite direction and from on-the-job search within each sector.
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sector, a job in this sector is created if and only if the match quality is higher
than a reservation match quality. The reservation match quality is endogenous
and depends on both the skill level and the current employment status of the
worker.6
The payoffs for workers are:
r˜U(p) = z +m(θI)
[
WI(p)− U(p)
]
+m(θF )
∫ 1
C(p)
[
WF (s, p)− U(p)
]
dG(s) (3.1)
r˜WF (x, p) = wF (x, p) + δ
[
U(p)−WF (x, p)
]
(3.2)
r˜WI(p) = wI(p) + δ
[
U(p)−WI(p)
]
+m(θF )
∫ 1
Q(p)
[
WF (s, p)−WI(p)
]
dG(s) (3.3)
where r˜ ≡ r + τ and r is the discount rate. U(p), WF (x, p), and WI(p) denote
the present discounted value of the expected income stream of an unemployed
worker, a worker employed in the formal sector, and a worker employed in the
informal sector, respectively. Employed workers earn wage wI(p) or wF (x, p)
when they work in the informal or the formal sector, respectively. The reserva-
tion match quality for the unemployed is C(p) and for informal sector workers
is Q(p).
For workers of skill level p, the value of unemployment, r˜U(p), depends on
three main factors. First, unemployed workers receive flow utility z, which can
be thought as the utility derived from leisure. Second, if they find an infor-
mal sector job, they experience a gain of [WI(p)− U(p)], and this happens with
probability m(θI). Third, if they find a formal sector job, they experience a gain
6We follow Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2005) in this job creation mechanism with two
worker skill levels, firing cost, and initial random draw determining cut-offs for job creation.
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of [WF (s, p) − U(p)]. For unemployed workers, the probability of finding a for-
mal sector job depends on: (i) the probability of meeting a formal sector firm
with an empty vacancy, m(θF ), and (ii) the probability that the match is worth
forming, i.e. that the match quality randomly drawn is higher than C(p).
For formal sector workers of skill level p currently employed with match
quality x, the value of formal sector employment, r˜WF (x, p), depends on two
main factors. First, they receive wage wF (x, p). Second, with probability δ they
lose their job and experience a loss of [U(p)−WF (x, p)].
Finally, for informal sector workers of skill level p, the value of informal
sector employment, r˜WI(p), depends on three main factors. First, they receive
wage wI(p). Second, with probability δ they lose their job and experience a loss
of [U(p) −WI(p)]. Third, if they find a formal sector job, they experience a gain
of [WF (s, p) −WI(p)]. For informal sector workers, the probability of finding a
formal sector job depends on: (i) the probability of meeting a formal sector firm
with an empty vacancy, m(θF ), and (ii) the probability that the match is worth
forming, i.e. that the match quality randomly drawn is higher than Q(p).
The payoffs for firms are:
r˜JF (x, p) = px− wF (x, p) + δ
[
VF −D − JF (x, p)
]
+ τVF (3.4)
r˜JI(p) = pI − wI(p) +
[
δ + µ(p)
][
VI − JI(p)
]
+ τVI (3.5)
rVF = −kF +
m(θF )
θF
(
EX,P
[
JF (x, p)|φU , φI
]
− VF
)
(3.6)
rVI = −kI +
m(θI)
θI
(
EP
[
JI(p)|φU
]
− VI
)
(3.7)
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where µ(p) ≡ m(θF )
[
1 − G
(
Q(p)
)]
, JF (x, p), and JI(p) denote the present dis-
counted value of the expected profit from an occupied job in the formal and
the informal sector, respectively, and Vj denotes the present discounted value
of expected profit from a vacant job in sector j ∈ {F, I}. Note that (3.4) incor-
porates firing costs, (3.5) incorporates the possibility that the worker moves to
the formal sector, and that the value of an open vacancy depends on the re-
cruitment costs, kj, and on the fraction of low-skilled job seekers, given by φU
in unemployment and φI in the informal sector.
For a firm in the formal sector matched with a worker of skill level p and
current match quality x, the value of the filled vacancy, r˜JF (x, p), depends on
three main factors. First, the firm has a profit of [px − wF (x, p)]. Second, if
the job is destroyed, the firm experiences a loss of [VF −D − JF (x, p)]. Third, if
the worker dies, the firm is left with an empty vacancy, and this happens with
probability τ .
For a firm in the informal sector matched with a worker of skill level p, the
value of the filled vacancy, r˜JI(p), depends on three main factors. First, the
firm has a profit of [pI −wI(p)]. Second, with probability δ the jobs is destroyed,
and with probability µ(p) the worker quits in order to take a formal sector job.
In both cases, the firm suffers a loss of [VI − JI(p)]. Third, if the worker dies,
the firm is left with an empty vacancy, and this happens with probability τ .
In both sectors, the value of an open vacancy depends on two main factors.
First, it depends on the recruitment costs, kj, for j ∈ {F, I}. Second, it depends
57
on the gain from filling the vacancy. This gain depends on the distribution
of L-skilled and H-skilled workers that may contact the firm. For informal
sector firms, since only unemployed workers contact them, the gain is given by
[EP
[
JI(p)|φU
]
− VI ], where EP
[
JI(p)|φU
]
= φUJI(pL) + (1− φU)JI(pH). For formal
sector firms, since both unemployed and informal sector workers contact them,
the gain is given by [EX,P
[
JF (x, p)|φU , φI
]
− VF ], where:
EX,P [JF (x, p)|φU , φI ] = φU
∫ 1
C(pL)
JF (x, pL)dG(x) + (1− φU)
∫ 1
C(pH )
JF (x, pH)dG(x)
+ φI
∫ 1
Q(pL)
JF (x, pL)dG(x) + (1− φI)
∫ 1
Q(pH)
JF (x, pH)dG(x),
where φU and φI are the steady state proportion of L-skilled workers in unem-
ployment and in the informal sector, respectively.
Wages in both sectors are determined according to a surplus sharing rule
that entitles workers to a fraction β of the match surplus. The match surplus
in the informal sector is SI(p) = WI(p) − U(p) + JI(p) − VI , and in the formal
sector is given by SF (x, p) =WF (x, p)−U(p)+JF (x, p)−VF . The resulting wages
are presented in Appendix B.1.
The decision to create a job in the formal sector depends on the match qual-
ity drawn when the worker and the firm meet. If the firm meets with an un-
employed worker, both the firm and the worker require x ≥ C(p) to match,
where C(p) is such that SF (C(p), p) = 0 for p ∈ {pL, pH}. If the firm meets with
a worker in the informal sector, they require x ≥ Q(p), where Q(p) is such that
SF (Q(p), p) = SI(p) for p ∈ {pL, pH}. Using the payoffs and wages, these cut-offs
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are given by:
C(p) =
r˜U(p)
p
+
δD
p
(3.8)
Q(p) = C(p) +
(r˜ + δ)SI(p)
p
(3.9)
where p ∈ {pH , pL}. Note that from (3.8) and (3.9) we cannot determine if
C(pH) < C(pL) and Q(pH) < Q(pL) without some assumptions on productiv-
ity levels in the formal and informal sectors. Lemma 1 provides a sufficient
condition that enables us to determine the relative size of the cut-offs.
Lemma 1. Let g(x) be the probability density function of the random variable
x with support on [0, 1] representing match quality. Let η =
1
1− β
(
pL
pI − z
)
. If
∀x ∈ [0, 1]
(
g(x)− η
∫ 1
x
g(u)du
)
< η(r˜ + δ),
then C(pH) < C(pL) and Q(pH) < Q(pL).
Appendix B.2.1 presents the proof of Lemma 1. The condition in Lemma 1 is
easily satisfied.7 This condition requires the distribution of match quality to be
smooth and without spikes, so that the random draw taken when the worker
and firm meet is relevant in the decision to create a job or keep looking for a
better match.
After substituting wages and cut-offs in the match surplus in the formal sec-
tor, we find that SF (x, p) =
p
r˜ + δ
(x− C(p)). Then, given the result in Lemma
1 and that pH > pL, it follows that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], SF (x, pH) > SF (x, pL) and
7Notice that if pL > pI , then η > 1, since by assumption pI ≥ z. The larger η, the easier for
the condition in Lemma 1 to be satisfied.
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∂SF (x, pH)/∂x > ∂SF (x, pL)/∂x. Figure 3.4 illustrates this result, and the fact
that C(pH) < C(pL) and Q(pH) < Q(pL). Note that SI(p) > 0 implies that
Q(p) > C(p) for p ∈ {pL, pH}, as a consequence informal sector workers are
more selective than unemployed workers when it comes to matching with a
formal sector firm.
Figure 3.4: Reservation Match Quality for Employed and Unemployed Workers
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The baseline model produces implications for the hazard rate from the in-
formal to the formal sector. We distinguish between the hazard rate conditional
on worker skill level, denoted λ(t|p), and the unconditional (or average) hazard
rate, denoted λ(t); where t is the realization of a random variable T ≥ 0 mea-
suring duration of employment in the informal sector and p ∈ {pL, pH}. These
results are summarized in Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the condition in Lemma 1 holds. Then, in the
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baseline model, the hazard rate from the informal to the formal sector condi-
tional on the worker skill level, λ(t|p), is constant for each p ∈ {pL, pH}, and it is
higher for H-skilled workers than for L-skilled workers.
Proof. In the baseline model, the hazard rate conditional on worker skill is
given by λ(t|p) = µ(p) = m(θF )
[
1 − G(Q(p))
]
, so that ∂λ(t|p)/∂t = 0. By Lemma
1, Q(pH) < Q(pL), which implies that λ(t|pH) > λ(t|pL).
Proposition 2. In the baseline model, the unconditional hazard rate, λ(t), is
decreasing in duration.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows the arguments of Lancaster (1990) and is
presented in Appendix B.2.2. In this model, the fraction of L-skilled workers
in the risk set (i.e. those that have not left the informal sector yet) increases
with duration, pushing down the average hazard rate. This fraction increases
with duration because H-skilled workers move from the informal to the formal
sector at a faster rate than L-skilled workers. Lancaster (1990) calls this a
“selection effect.”
3.3 Extensions to the Baseline Model
The baseline model provides an analytical framework that helps us understand
the key factors underlying the transitions from the informal to the formal sec-
tor. However, this model predicts that the transition rates from the informal
to the formal sector remain constant as workers age. Yet, as shown in Figures
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3.2 and 3.3, this is not the case in the data. Instead, we observe that transition
rates increase as workers age (during early stages of the workers’ careers).
We consider two extensions to the baseline model intended to explain this
feature in the data. First, we assume that workers can accumulate human
capital while working, which increases the chance of finding a formal sector
job. Second, we assume that employers gradually learn about workers’ skills.
As a result, workers who are found to be H-skilled increase their chances of
finding a formal sector job. We implement each extension separately because,
as shown below, each mechanism generates opposing implications that would
be hard to disentangle in a model with both mechanisms.
We focus on the implications for the hazard rate from the informal to the
formal sector. On the one hand, when we assume that a worker can become
more productive while in the informal sector, the longer such a worker stays
in this sector, the more likely he is to make a transition into the formal sector.
On the other hand, when we assume that a worker’s productivity is gradually
learned, those discovered as highly productive move to the formal sector faster,
leaving behind those with low productivity levels and hence greater difficulties
to access formal sector jobs. Thus, the longer a worker stays in the informal
sector, the lower the likelihood that he makes a transition to the formal sector.
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3.3.1 Human Capital Accumulation
First, we extend the baseline model by adding the possibility that workers ac-
cumulate skills through learning-by-doing. We follow Rebie`re (2008) and as-
sume that a L-skilled worker can accumulate skills and become H-skilled with
probability κ.8 The accumulation of skills can only take place on the job, so
the unemployed L-skilled workers cannot become H-skilled. Human capital
does not depreciate, but since workers die and are replaced, the model does not
converge to a degenerate distribution of skills.
The payoffs for unemployed workers and for vacancies have the same for-
mulation as in the baseline model. The payoffs for employed workers and for
filled vacancies now incorporate the possibility of accumulating skills. These
are given by:
r˜WF (x, p) = wF (x, p) + δ
[
U(p)−WF (x, p)
]
+ κ
[
WF (x, pH)−WF (x, p)
]
(3.10)
r˜WI(p) = wI(p) + δ
[
U(p)−WI(p)
]
+ κ
[
WI(pH)−WI(p)
]
+m(θF )
∫ 1
Q(p)
[
WF (s, p)−WI(p)
]
dG(s) (3.11)
r˜JF (x, p) = px−wF (x, p)+δ
[
VF−D−JF (x, p)
]
+κ
[
JF (x, pH)−JF (x, p)
]
+τVF (3.12)
r˜JI(p) = pI − wI(p) +
[
δ + µ(p)
][
VI − JI(p)
]
+ κ
[
JI(pH)− JI(p)
]
+ τVI . (3.13)
8In Rebie`re (2008), workers start as beginners and become experienced while working in
the beginners’ sub-market; once they are experienced they search for jobs in the experienced
sub-market. The labor market is segmented, so only beginners search for jobs in the beginners’
sub-market, and only experienced search for jobs in the experienced sub-market.
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The terms that account for the accumulation of skills disappear when p = pH ,
so the value functions for H-skilled workers have the same formulation as in
the baseline model.
For L-skilled workers in this model, the value of employment increases by
the possibility of accumulating human capital, which happens with probability
κ either in the formal or in the informal sector. The worker’s gain from human
capital accumulation is given by [WF (x, pH) − WF (x, pL)] if the worker is em-
ployed in the formal sector, and by [WI(pH)−WI(pL)] if the worker is employed
in the informal sector.
Firms with filled vacancies also benefit from the worker’s human capital ac-
cumulation. A formal sector firm matched with a L-skilled worker and current
match quality x experiences a gain of [JF (x, pH) − JF (x, pL)] with probability
κ, and an informal sector firm matched with a L-skilled worker experiences a
gain of [JI(pH)− JI(pL)] with probability κ.
Wages are determined by the surplus sharing rule. The resulting wages
for this model are presented in Appendix B.1. The reservation match qualities
for unemployed and employed workers are determined in terms of the match
surplus in the formal sector. That is, SF (C(p), p) = 0 and SF (Q(p), p) = SI(p). In
this model the cut-offs are given by:
C(p) =
r˜U(p)
p
+
δD
p
− κ
(
U(pH)− U(p)
p
)
− κ
(
SF (C(p), pH)
p
)
(3.14)
Q(p) = C(p) +
(r˜ + δ)SI(p)
p
− κ
(
SF (Q(p), pH)− SI(p)− SF (C(p), pH)
p
)
(3.15)
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where the terms that account for the accumulation of skills disappear when
p = pH . Note that the direct effect of human capital accumulation is to reduce
the cut-offs for L-skilled workers; this effect is picked up by the negative terms
in both (3.14) and (3.15). An indirect effect of human capital accumulation
increases the cut-offs for L-skilled, because both the value of unemployment
and the match surplus in the informal sector increase.
Obtaining results similar to those in Lemma 1 is much more complicated
with the inclusion of human capital accumulation. Consider environments
which satisfy the following conditions:
Condition 1. ∀x ∈ [0, 1], SF (x, pH) > SF (x, pL).
Condition 2. ∀x ∈ [0, 1], SF (x, pH)− SF (x, pL) > SI(pH)− SI(pL).
These two conditions impose complementarities between the production
technology in the formal sector and worker skills. Condition 1 implies that
formal sector firms have a strict preference for H-skilled workers. If satisfied,
then C(pH) < C(pL). Condition 2 implies that the marginal value of skills
is higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector. If satisfied, then
Q(pH) < Q(pL). These two implications can be easily verified in Figure 3.4.
If Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, the human capital model preserves the
same ranking in cut-offs as in the baseline model. With this, we can derive
similar implications for the conditional and unconditional hazard rates. These
results are summarized in Propositions 3 and 4.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then, in the
model with human capital accumulation, the hazard rate from the informal to
the formal sector conditional on worker’s initial skill level, λ(t|p), is constant for
H-skilled workers and increasing for L-skilled workers.
Proof. The conditional hazard rate for H-skilled workers is λ(t|pH) = µ(pH),
which is constant with respect to duration, t. Next, for L-skilled workers, the
conditional hazard rate is given by λ(t|pL) = (1 − κ)
tµ(pL) + [1 − (1 − κ)
t]µ(pH).
Then: ∂λ(t|p)/∂t = (1−κ)t ln(1−κ)
[
µ(pL)−µ(pH)
]
> 0, which is positive because
µ(pL) < µ(pH) and κ ∈ (0, 1).
When workers accumulate skills while working in the informal sector, the
increase in productivity derived from the accumulation of skills facilitates ac-
cess to job opportunities in the formal sector. Consequently, the likelihood of
moving from the informal to the formal sector for L-skilled workers increases
with tenure in the informal sector, resulting in an increasing hazard for L-
skilled workers.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Let φI be the
probability that p = pL in the informal sector. Then, in the model with human
capital accumulation, the unconditional hazard rate, λ(t), is:
(i) increasing if: − ln(1− κ) > (1− φI)
[
µ(pH)− µ(pL)
]
(ii) U-shaped otherwise.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows the arguments of Lancaster (1990) and
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is presented in Appendix B.2.2. This Proposition states that when κ is large,
the higher transition rate to the formal sector of H-skilled workers does not
increase the fraction of L-skilled in the risk set, because L-skilled workers ac-
cumulate skills at a faster rate. As such, the hazard rate is increasing in du-
ration. In contrast, if κ is not very large, it takes some time for the L-skilled
to accumulate skills, and the higher transition rate of the H-skilled results in
a higher fraction of L-skilled in the risk set. In this case, the hazard rate is
initially decreasing. However, eventually L-skilled workers accumulate skills,
so the fraction of L-skilled in the risk set decreases, resulting in an increasing
hazard for higher durations.
3.3.2 Employer Learning (Screening)
In this extension of the baseline model, we abstract from human capital accu-
mulation. Instead, we assume that when workers enter the labor market, their
skill level (or type) is not known, but it is eventually revealed while they are
working. We refer to these workers as “newcomers.” We assume that neither
the worker nor the employer knows the newcomer’s type, and that once the
type is revealed, everybody can observe the worker’s skill level, as in Farber
and Gibbons (1996). The revelation process is a stochastic process such that
the worker’s skill is revealed with probability σ.
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All newcomers start unemployed, and it is common knowledge that a frac-
tion φ of them are L-skilled. Newcomers also follow a reservation match qual-
ity strategy when facing formal sector job opportunities, taking informal sector
opportunities as they arrive. When the worker’s type is revealed in a formal
sector job, the job could be destroyed if the current match quality is below the
reservation match quality for that worker’s type.
Let C be the reservation match quality for unemployed newcomers, and Q
be the reservation match quality for newcomers holding an informal sector job.
In the current study we focus on cases that satisfy the following condition:
Condition 3. C(pH) < C < C(pL) and Q(pH) < Q < Q(pL).
If Condition 3 holds, then all formal sector workers found to be H-skilled
keep their job. On the contrary, a formal sector worker found to be L-skilled
with match quality x < C(pL) loses his job, in which case the firm incurs firing
costs. If the worker is found to be L-skilled but match quality is x > C(pL),
then the worker keeps his job.
The payoffs and the reservation match quality for L-skilled and H-skilled
workers have the same formulation as that in the baseline model. Let p¯ ≡
φpL + (1 − φ)pH reflect the expected formal sector productivity for newcomers.
Given Condition 3 holds, the payoffs for newcomers are given by:
r˜U = z +m(θI)[WI − U ] +m(θF )
∫ 1
C
[WF (s)− U ]dG(s) (3.16)
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r˜WF (x) = wF (x) + δ[U −WF (x)] + σ(1− φ)WF (x, pH)
+ σφ
[
ΓL(x)U(pL) + (1− ΓL(x))WF (x, pL)
]
− σWF (x) (3.17)
r˜WI = wI + δ[U −WI ] +m(θF )
∫ 1
Q
[WF (s)−WI ]dG(s)
+ σφWI(pL) + σ(1− φ)WI(pH)− σWI (3.18)
r˜JF (x) = p¯x− wF (x) + δ[VF −D − JF (x)] + σ(1− φ)JF (x, pH)
+ σφ
(
ΓL(x)[VF −D] + (1− ΓL(x))JF (x, pL)
)
− σJF (x) + τVF (3.19)
r˜JI = pI − wI + [δ + µ¯][VI − JI ] + σφJI(pL) + σ(1− φ)JI(pH)− σJI + τVI (3.20)
where µ¯ ≡ m(θF )[1−G(Q)], and ΓL(x) = 1{x < C(pL)}.
For unemployed newcomers, the value of unemployment, r˜U , depends on
three main factors. First, unemployed newcomers receive flow utility z. Sec-
ond, if they find an informal sector job, they experience a gain of [WI − U ], and
this happens with probability m(θI). Third, if they find a formal sector job, they
experience a gain of [WF (s) − U ]. For unemployed newcomers, the probability
of finding a formal sector job depends on: (i) the probability of meeting a for-
mal sector firm with an empty vacancy, m(θF ), and (ii) the probability that the
match is worth forming, i.e. that the match quality randomly drawn is higher
than C.
For newcomers employed in the formal sector with current match quality x,
the value of formal sector employment, WF (x), depends on three main factors.
First, they receive wage wF (x). Second, they experience a loss of [U −WF (x)] if
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the job is destroyed, which happens with probability δ. Third, with probability
σ, their skill level is revealed, in which case they might keep or lose their job.
On the one hand, if a worker is found to be H-skilled, then the worker keeps
his job and experiences a gain of [WF (x, pH) − WF (x)]. On the other hand, if
the worker is found to be L-skilled, then two things may happen: (i) if the
current match quality is higher than C(pL), then the worker keeps his job, but
experiences a loss of [WF (x, pL) −WF (x)], and (ii) if the current match quality
is lower than C(pL), then the worker loses his job and experiences a loss of
[U(pL)−WF (x)].
By comparison, for formal sector firms matched with a newcomer with cur-
rent match quality x, the value of the filled vacancy, r˜JF (x), depends on three
main factors. First, the firm has profit [p¯x − wF (x)]. Second, with probability
δ the job is destroyed and the firm suffers a loss of [VF − D − JF (x)]. Third,
with probability σ the worker’s skill level is revealed, and then the firm may
keep the worker or let him go. If the worker is found to be H-skilled, the firm
keeps the worker, and experiences a gain of [JF (x, pH) − JF (x)]. If the worker
is found to be L-skilled, two things can happen: (i) if the current match qual-
ity is higher than C(pL), then the firm keeps the worker, but suffers a loss of
[JF (x, pL) − JF (x)], and (ii) if the current match quality is lower than C(pL),
then the firm has to let the worker go, suffering a loss of [VF −D − JF (x)].
For newcomers employed in the informal sector, the value of informal sec-
tor employment, r˜WI , depends on four main factors. First, newcomers receive
70
wage wI . Second, if the job is destroyed, they suffer a loss of [U −WI ]. Third,
if they find a formal sector job, they experience a gain of [WF (s) − WI ]. For
newcomers employed in the informal sector, the probability of finding a formal
sector job depends on: (i) the probability of meeting a formal sector firm with
an empty vacancy, m(θF ), and (ii) the probability that the match is worth form-
ing, i.e. that the match quality randomly drawn is higher than Q. Fourth, if
their skill level is revealed, then they experience a gain of [WI(pH)−WI ] if they
are found to be H-skilled, and a loss of [WI(pL) − WI ] if they are found to be
L-skilled.
By comparison, for informal sector firms matched with a newcomer, the
value of the filled vacancy, r˜JI , depends on four main factors. First, the firm
has profit [pI − wI ]. Second, with probability δ the job is destroyed. Third, with
probability µ¯ the worker quits to take a formal sector job. In any of these two
situations, the firm suffers a loss of [VI − JI ]. Fourth, if the worker skill level is
revealed, then the firm experiences a gain of [JI(pH)−JI ] if the worker is found
to be H-skilled, and a loss of [JI(pH)− JI ] if the worker is found to be L-skilled.
Wages for this model are presented in Appendix B.1. Given Condition 3,
reservation match qualities for newcomers are:
C =
r˜U
p¯
+
δD
p¯
+
σφD
p¯
−
σ[φU(pL) + (1− φ)U(pH)− U ]
p¯
−
σ(1− φ)SF (C, pH)
p¯
(3.21)
Q =
r˜U
p¯
+
δD
p¯
+
ΓL(Q)σφD
p¯
−
σ[φU(pL) + (1− φ)U(pH)− U ]
p¯
−
[1− ΓL(Q)]σφSF (C, pL)
p¯
−
σ(1− φ)SF (Q, pH)
p¯
+
(r˜ + δ + σ)SI
p¯
. (3.22)
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Note that if ΓL(Q) = 1, then Q ≈ C +
(r˜ + δ + σ)SI
p¯
. Again, these hiring stan-
dards give us some implications in terms of the hazard rates from the informal
to the formal sector, which are summarized in Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the condition in Lemma 1 and Condition 3 hold.
Then, in the model with employer learning, the hazard rate from the informal
to the formal sector conditional on the worker skill level, λ(t|p), is increasing for
H-skilled workers and decreasing for L-skilled workers.
Proof. The conditional hazard rate is given by λ(t|p) = (1−σ)tµ¯+[1−(1−σ)t]µ(p),
for each p ∈ {pH , pL}. Let ∂λ(t|p)/∂t = λ
′(t|p), then λ′(t|p) = (1−σ)t ln(1−σ)
[
µ¯−
µ(p)
]
, which is positive for p = pH because µ¯ < µ(pH) and σ ∈ (0, 1), and negative
for p = pL because µ¯ > µ(pL) and σ ∈ (0, 1).
In this model, employers can distinguish three different groups of workers.
However, everyone knows that newcomers are either L-skilled or H-skilled.
H-skilled workers face an increasing hazard in their informal sector career be-
cause once they are revealed as H-skilled, the likelihood of finding a formal
sector job increases. On the contrary, L-skilled workers face a decreasing haz-
ard.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the condition in Lemma 1 and Condition 3 hold.
Let φ be the probability that p = pL in the labor market. Then, in the model with
employer learning, the unconditional hazard rate, λ(t), is:
(i) decreasing if µ¯ > φµ(pL) + (1− φ)µ(pH)
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(ii) hump-shaped otherwise.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows the arguments of Lancaster (1990) and
is presented in Appendix B.2.2. Proposition 6 states that the shape of the un-
conditional hazard function initially depends on whether the hazard rate of
newcomers is higher or lower than the average hazard rate of workers with re-
vealed types. Cases (i) and (ii) compare these two hazard rates. Eventually, as
more worker types are revealed, the hazard function decreases with duration
due to selection, as in the baseline model.
Whether case (i) or (ii) arises depends on: a) the mixture of H-skilled and
L-skilled workers in the population, summarized by φ; b) the location of Q with
respect to Q(pL) and Q(pH); and c) the properties of the distribution of match
quality, G(x). Note that Q is not determined by Q
(
φpL + (1 − φ)pH
)
, and so we
cannot raise conclusions in terms of the properties of Q(·), defined in equation
(3.9). Even so, case (i) is more likely to occur if G(x) ≡ [1−G(x)] is concave (or
G(x) convex), so that the convex combination φG
(
Q(pL)
)
+ (1 − φ)G
(
Q(pH)
)
is
lower than G(Q). In contrast, case (ii) is more likely to arise if G(x) is convex
(or G(x) concave), so that the convex combination of G
(
Q(pL)
)
and G
(
Q(pH)
)
is
higher than G(Q).9
9Simulation exercises assuming that G(·) is uniform indicate that whether case (i) or (ii)
arises is mainly determined by the fraction of L-skilled workers in the population, φ. These
exercises show that φ is the main determinant of the location of Q with respect to Q(pL) and
Q(pH). The larger φ is, the closer Q is to Q(pL), and the more likely that case (ii) arises.
Intuitively, when φ is large, formal sector employers treat “newcomers” as if they were L-
skilled. As a result, both “newcomers” and L-skilled workers in the informal sector move to
the formal sector at similar rates, whereas H-skilled in the informal sector move at faster
rates. Hence, for short spells (low t) the hazard increases when the first “newcomers” see their
73
3.3.3 Understanding the Role of the Informal Sector in
the Early Careers of Less-educated Workers
We are now in a position to assess the role of the informal sector in the early
stages of the careers of less-educated workers. The implications derived earlier
suggest estimating the hazard function from the informal to the formal sector
to determine whether human capital accumulation or screening/learning are
important in the informal sector. We estimate these hazard functions using
data from an employment survey from Mexico. In the next section, we describe
the data, the sample, and some details of the variables used in estimation.
3.4 Data: The ENOE
We use a household survey from Mexico called the Occupation and Employ-
ment Survey, ENOE (its acronym in Spanish). The ENOE is a rotating panel
where households are visited five times during 12 months, one visit every three
months. Every three months, 20% of the sample is replaced. Although infor-
mation from each family member is recorded, this information is provided by
only one member; the respondent is not necessarily the same individual on
each visit.
The ENOE records the demographics of each family member (e.g. education,
skill level being revealed because H-skilled have a faster exit rate than both “newcomers” and
L-skilled.
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age, marital status), and information on the main and secondary jobs of family
members older than 12 years of age. Job information includes working hours,
earnings, fringe benefits, job position, firm size, industry, occupation and job
tenure. The job tenure information is only recorded in the long form of the
ENOE, which is answered at least once during the five visits to the household.
For further details about the ENOE see INEGI (2005, 2007).
3.4.1 Sample
To focus on less-educated workers, we restrict the sample to individuals not
currently attending school and with less than 12 years of education. To focus
on young workers, our sample only includes workers between the ages of 16
and 25. Age 16 is the minimum age at which a worker can be hired according
to Mexican Labor Law (see Congress, 1970), and age 25 is the age at which
transitions from the informal to the formal sector plateau (see Figures 3.2 and
3.3). Our sample only includes male workers because women may have differ-
ent reasons for joining the informal sector, e.g. job flexibility to balance work
and child rearing (Arias and Maloney, 2007).
We divide our sample of less-educated workers into two groups based on
completion of the mandatory level of education in Mexico, which is 9 years. In
one group, we include less-educated workers who failed to complete the manda-
tory level of education, and in the other those who completed the mandatory
level of education but who failed to complete high school (i.e. 12 years). Since
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the mandatory level of education in Mexico could be compared to junior high
school in the U.S., we refer to the first group as junior high school dropouts,
and the second as junior high school graduates.10
Table 3.1 presents the sample summary statistics. For the purpose of this
table, the group of junior high school dropouts is further divided in two groups.
Junior high school graduates represent 63% of the sample. Workers in all three
groups are mainly concentrated in small firms, but the junior high school grad-
uates have the highest percentage in large firms. Also, note that the two groups
of junior high school dropouts are mainly concentrated in the construction in-
dustry, while graduates are mainly concentrated in the services industry. Fi-
nally, note that graduates are more likely to have a parent working in a formal
sector job. Firm size, industry, and family head employment status could be
important determinants of the probability of moving from the informal to the
formal sector.
3.4.2 Identification of Informal Salaried Workers
When a worker is hired in Mexico, it is the employer’s responsibility to register
the worker in the IMSS or the ISSSTE.11 These institutions provide a bundle of
benefits to their affiliates. For example, the bundle offered by IMSS includes:
10In Mexico, compulsory education comprises primary school (grades 1 to 6) and junior high
school (grades 7 to 9). In terms of our labeling, note that some of the individuals in the junior
high school dropout group may not have even started junior high school.
11IMSS is the acronym in Spanish for the Mexican Institute of Social Security and ISSSTE is
the acronym in Spanish for the Institute of Security and Social Services for the State’s Workers.
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health insurance, day-care services for children, life insurance, disability pen-
sions, work-risk pensions, sports and cultural facilities, retirement pensions,
and housing loans (Levy, 2007). Both the worker and the employer must pay
fees to fund these institutions, but the portion paid by the employer is much
higher than that paid by the worker. If the firm is caught not complying with
these regulations, it incurs a penalty.
Once a worker is registered in the IMSS or the ISSSTE the work relation-
ship must abide by the labor regulation in Mexico. This means that the em-
ployer will incur firing costs if the work relationship is terminated.
The questionnaire of the ENOE does not ask the individual whether he is
a formal or an informal worker. Instead, the survey asks the individual if his
job gives him access to medical services provided by: the IMSS, the ISSSTE,
the military hospital, the PEMEX hospital, or any other hospital (i.e. private
hospital).12 We consider a worker to belong to the formal sector if he is an
employee and his job gives him access to any kind of medical services: from
IMSS, ISSSTE, military, PEMEX, or private; and to belong to the informal
sector if he is an employee and his job does not give him access to any of these
services. Note that the self-employed are not included in our definition of the
informal sector.
12PEMEX is the state-owned petroleum company in Mexico. Both, military and PEMEX
workers, have access to medical services independent of IMSS or ISSSTE. Workers that have
access to private medical services are usually hired formally, and even though they do not use
the medical service of IMSS, they are registered at the IMSS, and could use it if desired.
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3.4.3 Measuring Duration in the Informal Sector
Duration of employment in the informal sector is obtained using two differ-
ent sampling schemes: flow sampling and stock sampling. In the flow sample,
we include individuals who enter the informal sector during a fixed period of
time, namely the 12 months in which the ENOE follows households.13 In the
stock sample, we include individuals who are already in the informal sector at
a given point in time, namely the month of the visit in which the household an-
swered the long form of the ENOE. The date of the visit in which the long form
is answered is used as the stock sampling date because the long form records
the starting date of the current job.14 The starting date is either recorded as:
(i) the exact month, if the job started in the current or the previous calendar
year, or (ii) the year, if the job started before the previous calendar year.
Duration of employment in the informal sector is defined as the length of
time that passes between the point in time in which the respondent enters the
informal sector and the point in time in which the respondent moves from the
informal to the formal sector. Duration is right-censored if the respondent is
still employed in the informal sector at the time of the last interview. Duration
of employment for individuals who leave the informal sector but do not enter
the formal sector is also treated as right-censored.
13We include in this sample individuals who enter the informal sector after the first but
before the fourth visits. Those who made a transition between the fourth and fifth visits are
not included, because we are not able to follow them after the fifth visit.
14We include in this sample informal sector workers whose long form interview took place in
the first, second, third, or fourth visits. If an individual answered the long form for more than
one visit, we use the first one as the stock sampling date.
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Given that the household is visited every three months, the point in time
of the transition from the informal to the formal sector either is known to be:
(i) the exact month, or (ii) contained in a 3-month interval. The second case
can arise in two situations: (i) if the respondent made such transition without
changing jobs, or (ii) if the respondent changed jobs, but the visit to the house-
hold following that transition did not use the long form questionnaire, and so
the starting time of the new job was not recorded.
Consequently, combining the two different formats in which the starting
time and the transition time are recorded, duration from the stock sample is
either known to the exact number of months or contained within some interval.
On the other hand, all duration measures from the flow sample are interval-
censored. This is because the starting time is never exactly known, but only
known within three months (the time between interviews). Thus, whether the
point in time of the transition is known to the month or within a 3-month in-
terval does not change the fact that the completed duration will be only known
within an interval.
Table 3.2 describes the distribution of formats in which duration in the
informal sector is recorded in the sample. The most frequent intervals are
6-month for the flow sample, and 3-month and 15-month for the stock sam-
ple. This is a result of the frequency in which the household is visited.15 The
15In the flow sample, both the point in time in which the individual enters the informal sector
and the point in time in which the individual moves to the formal sector can be only known
within a 3-month interval, which results in a 6-month interval. This turns out to be the most
frequent case in the sample. In the flow sample, the starting time of the job is either know to
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numbers in the table also reveal the fact that the sample is subject to a high
degree of right-censoring. Sixty percent of the spells in the sample are right-
censored. Table 3.3 describes the source of censoring in the sample. Among
those censored observations, 52% are due to the respondent being employed
in the informal sector at the time of the last interview, 29% are due to the
respondent moving out of the informal sector to another work status, such as
self-employment, and 20% are due to the respondent becoming unemployed.
To summarize, let Ti be the duration of employment in the informal sector
for respondent i. We either observe Ti up to the exact number of months, or an
interval (Li, Ri] such that Ti ∈ (Li, Ri]. Similarly, let Ci be the censoring time
for respondent i. Then, for censored observations we only know that Ti > Ci, or
that (Li, Ri] = (Ci,∞). Notice that because different respondents have different
starting dates, the intervals (Li, Ri] may overlap for different respondents. As
a result, we cannot use the techniques of discrete time duration analysis (e.g.
Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Meyer, 1990; Han and Hausman, 1990). We must
instead work with interval-censored data (e.g. Finkelstein, 1986; Sun, 2006).
Finally, some of the spells in the sample have starting times on a date before
the individual reaches age 16. Individuals who started their informal sector
jobs before age 16 may delay their transition to the formal sector owing to leg-
islative restrictions, and not for the reasons stipulated in the model. We adjust
the month or within a 12-month interval, and the point in time of the transition to the formal
sector can be known within a 3-month interval, which results in a 3-month or in a 15-month
interval. These are the two most frequent cases in the sample.
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the duration measure of these individuals by subtracting from their duration
the number of months worked before age 16, and create an indicator variable
for them, which is included in the covariates. In this way, all job spells measure
the time that the individuals were “at risk” of making a transition to the for-
mal sector. About 2% of the spells in the sample are adjusted because of their
pre-age 16 starting point.
Table 3.4 summarizes the duration data generated from the ENOE. For this
table, we impute interval-censored duration measures with the midpoint in the
interval. Note that the mean duration of employment in the informal sector is
lower for junior high school graduates. In fact, the distribution of duration for
junior high school graduates first-order-stochastically dominates that of the
dropouts, suggesting that graduates move to the formal sector at a faster rate
than the dropouts.
Before proceeding with the estimation, it is important to mention that the
implications from the models derived in the previous sections are in terms “sec-
tor spells.” However, in the estimation below we will be using measures of “job
spells.” Given that we cannot follow the individual since the first time they
entered the labor market, we have to work with the spell of the last job held by
the individual. To the extent that the individual held other informal jobs before
the current informal job, we would be underestimating the length of the sector
spells, or in other words, the sector spells would be left-censored. It is in our
advantage, however, that we are working with a sample of young workers, and
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so we should expect that the job spells should be similar to the sector spells.
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 Likelihood Function
The likelihood function is defined in terms of the hazard function, which is
conditioned on a set of time-invariant covariates, x. The inclusion of covari-
ates is very important in the presence of right-censoring in order to make valid
inference. The right-censoring mechanism must satisfy the assumption of in-
dependent censoring (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980). In terms of duration of
employment in the informal sector, independent censoring requires that, con-
ditional on x, an individual’s duration is not censored because such individual
has an unusually high (or low) probability of moving to the formal sector.16
In the ENOE, because all households are visited exactly five times, censor-
ing as a result of the individual working in the informal sector during the last
visit satisfies independent censoring. But we must be cautious with the dura-
tion of employment of individuals whose transition to the formal sector is not
observed because they moved to another state (e.g. self-employment). The du-
ration of employment of these individuals is right-censored, but the assumption
16Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) define a censoring scheme as independent if “the proba-
bility of censoring at time t depends only on the covariate x, the observed pattern of failures
and censoring up to time t in the trial, or on random processes that are independent of the
failure times in the trial.” In the case of duration of employment in the informal sector, failure
is defined as a transition from the informal to the formal sector.
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of independent censoring could be violated if they were systematically more (or
less) likely to make a transition to the formal sector.
To that end, in our covariates we include variables that also explain why
these individuals move to another state beforemoving to the formal sector. The
covariates include industry, firm size, educational attainment, government’s
financial support to self-employment, marital status, condition of employment
of the family head, and dummies for different starting years.
As mentioned before, we use time-invariant covariates, although some of
these covariates are in nature time-varying and could explain why some infor-
mal sector workers are more or less likely to make a transition to the formal
sector. In particular, the covariates for marital status and firm size may vary
over time and are important determinants of the transition from the informal
to the formal sector. It is possible that during the time that the worker was
employed in the informal sector his marital status changed from single to mar-
ried, and so the increase in the demand for medical services associated with
marriage could affect how fast the individual moves to the formal sector. Sim-
ilarly, firms that are expanding might have an increased demand for formal
sector jobs, or viceversa for a firm that is contracting. Levenson and Maloney
(1998) find that, in the case of Mexico, firms treat formality as a “normal” input,
and so its demand increases with the firm’s expansion.
For the stock sample, we can only observe changes in the covariates after
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the first interview, but we do not observe any changes before the first inter-
view. For workers in the stock sample, we use the value of the covariate at
the interview in which the long form of the ENOE was used. Although we can
observe changes in the covariates for workers in the flow sample, in order to be
consistent, we also fix the covariates for workers in this sample. For workers
in the flow sample, we use the value of the covariate at the interview in which
the informality status of the worker changed from not being informal to being
an informal sector worker.
Interval-censoring also imposes a requirement in order to make inference,
which is very similar to the one for right-censoring. Kalbfleisch and Prentice
define this requirement as independent interval censoring. Let 0 < Ci1 < Ci2 <
· · · < Cimi <∞ be the visiting dates for individual i. Independent interval cen-
soring requires that: “having observed that the individual is [in the informal
sector] at time Ci,j−1, the timing of the next [visit] is distributed independently
of the time of the [transition to the formal sector]” (Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
1980, page 79). Since the household visits are scheduled every three months,
this assumption is also satisfied in the ENOE. The assumption would be vio-
lated if the next visit is determined to be sooner (or later) depending on the
probability that the individual moves from the informal to the formal sector.
Now, recall that 60% of the duration measures are from the stock sample
(see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). It is known that stock sampling introduces a sam-
ple selection problem because long durations are more likely to be sampled
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than short durations (Wooldridge, 2002). This problem, known as length-biased
sampling (Kiefer, 1988), is easily addressed by including the starting time of
the job spell in the likelihood, or more precisely the length of time that passes
between the start of the job and the stock sampling date, which is know as the
elapsed duration. Thus, in order to account for this sampling bias, we include
the elapsed duration in the likelihood function.
Let T be a nonnegative random variable denoting the duration of employ-
ment in the informal sector, and let t be a particular value of T . Let λ(t|x)
be the hazard function of T , S(t|x) be the survivor function, which is defined
in terms of the hazard function as S(t|x) = exp{−
∫ t
0
λ(s|x)ds}, and let f(t|x)
be the density of T , which is defined as f(t|x) = λ(t|x)S(t|x). Given that both
censoring mechanisms are independent, the contribution of a right-censored
observation to the likelihood is Pr(Ti > Ci|x) = S(Ci|x), and the contribution
of an interval-censored observation is S(Li|xi)− S(Ri|xi). Let ei be the elapsed
duration of individual i, then the likelihood function is given by:
L(θ|xi) =
∏
{i|Υi=1}
f(ti|xi)
diS(ti|xi)
(1−di)
S(ei|xi)
∏
{i|Υi=0}
S(Li|xi)− S(Ri|xi)
S(ei|xi)
(3.23)
where Υi is an indicator for interval-censoring (Υi = 1 if uncensored, Υi = 0 if
interval-censored), and di is an indicator for right-censoring (di = 1 if uncen-
sored, di = 0 if right-censored).
Finally, as explained in the previous section, job starting times in the stock
sample are either known up to the month, or up to the year. The likelihood
function (3.23) assumes that we know ei or, equivalently, that we know the
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starting time. However, for some respondents, all we know is that this starting
time is included in a 12-month interval, if the job started before the previous
calendar year.
In order to overcome the coarseness of starting times, we performed a Monte
Carlo analysis to explore different alternatives to impute the starting time
when this information is interval-censored. The Monte Carlo analysis is pre-
sented in Chapter 4. Three methods to impute the elapsed duration were ex-
plored, using the: (i) lower bound of the interval, (ii) upper bound of the in-
terval, and (iii) midpoint of the interval. The simulation results indicate that,
for the case of duration data obtained from surveys like the ENOE, using the
midpoint in the interval outperforms the alternatives. The empirical analysis
in this paper follows the results from Chapter 4.
3.5.2 Hazard Function
To estimate the hazard, instead of imposing the functional form implied by
each model, we estimate a flexible hazard function. Widely used parametric
models such as the Weibull or the Log-logistic impose restrictions on the shape
of the hazard (see Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 20). For this reason, our main
results rely on the estimation of a piecewise constant hazard, which allows
more flexibility in the shape of the hazard function. We assume a proportional
hazards model λ(t|xi) = exp(x
′
iρ)λ0(t), where:
λ0(t) = λm, am−1 ≤ t < am, λm > 0, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M (3.24)
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and {a0, a1, . . . , aM} are known break points that defineM + 1 intervals [a0, a1),
[a1, a2), . . . , [aM−1, aM), [aM ,∞) that may contain t. We set a0 = 0, and choose
the other break points using the distribution of T . The distribution of T is
divided into six quantiles, so that M = 6, with break points determined by the
quantiles.17
The survivor function is given by:
S(t|xi) = exp

− exp(x′iρ)

I(t)−1∑
k=1
λk
(
ak − ak−1
)
+ λI(t)
(
t− aI(t)−1
)

 (3.25)
where I(t) is such that aI(t)−1 ≤ t < aI(t), i.e. t is contained in the I(t)
th interval.
We estimate the hazard function for the whole sample and for two mutually
exclusive education groups. The break points for each of these samples are:
months
Education Group a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
[ 0, 12 ) 3.0 4.5 6.0 12.0 24.0 104.0
[ 0, 9 ) 3.0 4.5 7.0 12.0 24.0 104.0
[ 9, 12 ) 3.0 3.5 6.0 11.0 24.0 96.0
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Piecewise Constant Hazard Function
Wemaximize the likelihood function in equation (3.23) using all of the elements
discussed in the previous section. The estimation results for the whole sample
17To avoid ties in the quantiles, the break points are the quantiles of Tˆi = (Li +Ri)/2.
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and for junior high school dropouts and graduates are summarized in Table
3.5. Figure 3.5 depicts the estimated baseline hazard with the 95% pointwise
confidence intervals. The plot of the baseline hazard in Figure 3.5 depicts the
hump-shaped pattern predicted by the model with employer learning. Note
that this pattern holds for the whole sample, and for the junior high school
dropouts and graduates.18
Even though both junior high school dropouts and graduates show signs of
employer learning, those who completed the mandatory level of education have
a higher hazard rate at all times. In terms of Proposition 7, this result indicates
that the proportion of L-skilled workers is higher among dropouts than among
graduates as one might expect.19
Estimated effects of the covariates in Table 3.5 are fairly similar for the
whole sample and for junior high school graduates and dropouts. The estima-
tion results for the whole sample show that graduation from primary school
(grade 6) has little effect on the hazard rates, but graduation from secondary
school (grade 9) has a significant effect. This is consistent with Arias and Mal-
oney (2007) who claim that “graduation to formal salaried work is unlikely for
18A similar estimation exercise was performed using only interval-censored weekly duration
measures instead of using monthly duration measures. The estimation results indicate the
same hump-shaped pattern in the hazard function for the three education groups.
19Alternatively, there could be more than two worker skill levels, with some of them con-
centrated in one education group, e.g. the highest concentrated in group of graduates and the
lowest concentrated in the group of dropouts. Note that we could extend the models to a con-
tinuum of worker types, as in Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2006, 2009). This would yield
similar results to those derived above.
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youth who drop out of school before completing at least a full course of sec-
ondary education” (Arias and Maloney, 2007, page 62) .
Not surprisingly, one of the most important covariates is the size of the firm.
The higher the firm size, the higher the hazard rate from the informal to the
formal sector. There are two potential explanations for this result. On the one
hand, many of the transitions could be happening within the same employer.
Alternatively, it could be that larger firms have a larger network and as a result
expose workers’ skills to other employers more than small firms do.
Industry does not play a big role in explaining the hazard rate from the
informal to the formal sector. Married workers have higher hazard rates than
single workers, consistent with the incremental demand for health services
when individuals form their own families. And when the family head works
in the formal sector, the individual also has a higher hazard rate, which could
also be the result of the individual having access to a larger network of formal
sector employers.20 Notice that the estimates for these covariates are larger for
junior high school dropouts than for the graduates.
Finally, note that a hump-shaped hazard rules out the baseline model. The
baseline model predicts constant hazard rates conditional on worker skill level,
which in turn implies that the unconditional survivor function is a mixture of
exponential distributions. Based on comments made by Chamberlain (1980),
20In Mexico, dependents of workers registered in the IMSS can only use the medical services
of this institution up to age 18. The coverage can be extended if the dependent is attending
school, which is not the case in our sample.
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Heckman, Robb, and Walker (1990) argue that “all mixtures of exponentials
models have nonincreasing hazards.” The pointwise confidence intervals for
our estimated hazard imply that the hazard is increasing for short spells,
thereby ruling out the baseline model (with any arbitrary number of worker
types).21
3.6.2 Parametric Hazard Functions
As a robustness check, we estimated two widely used parametric hazards, the
Weibull and the Log-logistic hazard models. We are mainly interested in the
estimation result from the Log-logistic model. The Weibull is characterized by
the hazard function:
λ(t) = ϕαtα−1 (3.26)
and the Log-logistic by:
λ(t) =
ϕαtα−1
1 + ϕtα
, (3.27)
where ϕ = exp(x′ρ) is the most common choice in empirical applications. The
shape of the hazard function in each case is determined by the parameter α, as
summarized in the following table:
21Using the estimated hazard function, and following the procedure suggested by Chamber-
lain, we conclude that the survivor function for the data in this study cannot be generated by
a mixture of exponentials. For a description of the rejection criterion and the procedure see
Chamberlain (1980) or Heckman, Robb, and Walker (1990).
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Weibull Log-logistic
α < 1 Decreasing Decreasing from∞ at t = 0, to 0 as t→∞
α = 1 Constant Decreasing from ϕ at t = 0, to 0 as t→∞
α > 1 Increasing Increasing from 0 at t = 0, to a single maximum T ∗,
and then approaches 0 as t→∞
When α > 1 in the Log-logistic, the maximum occurs at T ∗ = [(α− 1)/ϕ]1/α (see
Lancaster, 1990, chap. 3).
The estimated hazards for these two models are presented in Table 3.6.
The estimated coefficients for the covariates in the Weibull hazard are very
similar to the ones in the piecewise constant hazard, since both of these are
proportional hazards models. For the Log-logistic model, they are not iden-
tical but have the same pattern across the groups of dropouts and graduates
from junior high school. Given the restrictions of the Weibull hazard, the es-
timates suggest a monotonically decreasing hazard, but the Log-logistic sug-
gests a hump-shaped hazard. More importantly, the predicted maximum in
the Log-logistic hazard function is very similar to the maximum we have in the
piecewise constant hazard in Figure 3.5.22
22Likewise, a similar estimation exercise was performed using only interval-censored weekly
duration measures, instead of using monthly duration measures. The estimation results yield
very similar estimates for α in both the Weibull and the Log-logistic hazard functions.
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3.6.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The models developed in the previous sections are based on the premise that
there are two worker skill levels, which are not observable to the econome-
trician. For each model, we develop predictions based on the average (or un-
conditional) hazard function, which effectively integrates over any unobserved
heterogeneity. In fact, changes in unobserved types over time play an impor-
tant role in driving patterns of the average hazard functions used to identify
the different models. An advantage of our approach is that it is based on the es-
timation of the average hazard function, and so it does not require us to specify
a particular distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity.
3.6.4 A Final Comment on Testing the Implications
Notice that the implications of the three theoretical models presented in Propo-
sitions 2, 4, and 6, are defined in terms of duration of employment in the in-
formal sector from the time the worker entered the labor market. However,
the duration measures used in the estimation of the hazard functions are with
respect to the last job of the individual. To the extent that the individual ex-
perienced previous job spells in the informal sector, we are underestimating
this measure. On the other hand, the fact that we are working with a sample
of young individuals suggests that the underestimation is not very severe. A
similar estimation was performed using a younger sub-sample, which included
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only individuals ages 16 to 20. The estimation results from this exercise are
very similar and the hump-shape observed in the estimated hazard function
persists. These results yield further support to the suggestion that underesti-
mation of the duration of employment in the informal sector does not severely
affect our results and conclusions.
3.6.5 Screening in Be´cate Training Program
In this section we use the estimated piecewise constant hazard to infer the pa-
rameters governing the employer learning process. Knowledge of these param-
eters gives us the means to evaluate Be´cate’s screening program introduced in
Section 3.1. In terms of the employer learning model, we want to know how fast
employers learn about their workers’ abilities. This information is obtained
using the model-generated hazard and the estimated hazard. The uncondi-
tional hazard in the employer learning model is a function of five parameters,
(
µ¯, µ(pL), µ(pH), σ, φ
)
; while the piecewise constant hazard is a function of seven
parameters, (λ1, . . . , λ6, ρ). We use the estimated parameters
(
λˆ1, . . . , λˆ6, ρˆ
)
to
infer the value of the parameters of the employer learning model.
Let ν(t) ≡ λM
(
t; µ¯, µ(pL), µ(pH), σ, φ
)
− λPW
(
t; λˆ1, . . . , λˆ6, ρˆ
)
, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
denote the residual between the model generated hazard, λM(·), and the esti-
mated piecewise constant hazard, λPW (·). To get the parameters governing the
employers’ learning process, we look for the vector
(
µ¯, µ(pL), µ(pH), σ, φ
)
that
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minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The details of the optimization algo-
rithm are explained in Appendix B.3.
The estimated and the model-generated hazards are shown in Figure 3.6.
The resulting parameters indicate that employers learn their workers’ abilities
at a rate of σ = 0.1478 per month, and that the proportion of L-skilled workers
in the population is φ = 0.4833. Then, at the end of a three-month Be´cate
program, employers know the skill level of about 51% of the recruited workers,
where 48% of these workers are expected to be L-skilled. The firmwill be happy
to hire those workers identified as H-skilled, but must also fulfill its promise to
take 70% of the workers recruited for the program. This implies that the firm
must take a gamble in hiring 44% of the original number of workers whose skill
level is still unknown. However, since 48% of these workers are expected to to
be L-skilled, the firm will end up hiring 21% of the original number of workers
that are L-skilled. If the firm does not have a good match quality with these
L-skilled workers, it will incur firing costs.
Note that the numbers we are getting from this exercise on the Be´cate pro-
gram are at the aggregate level. It must be the case that in some industries,
the learning rate is very high, and for other industries it is very low. Be´cate is
a voluntary program, and so the firms that participate in the program must be
firms with high learning rates. The authorities must consider this if the goal
is to increase the number and types of firms participating in the program.
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3.7 Final Remarks
The present study asks whether work experience in the informal sector can
affect the career prospects of less-educated workers. The analysis focuses on
two potential roles of informal sector jobs: accumulation of skills and screen-
ing of workers’ ability. In the traditional queuing model of the informal sector
with heterogenous workers’ abilities, the hazard rate from the informal into
the formal sector decreases with duration of informal sector employment. This
study shows that, when informal sector jobs also enable workers to accumu-
late skills or employers to screen workers’ abilities, the shape of the hazard
function can be different from that predicted by the traditional queuing model.
Human capital accumulation implies an increasing or U-shaped hazard due to
the accumulation of skills (and the fact that more skilled workers leave the in-
formal sector faster). Screening can generate a hump-shaped hazard if workers
with observable ability leave (on average) faster than informal sector entrants,
resulting in an increasing hazard; eventually, as more skilled workers leave
faster, the hazard decreases with duration. These differences in the predicted
hazard suggests a procedure to decide which role of informal sector jobs is more
important.
The hazard function was estimated using an employment survey from Mex-
ico. The estimated hazard reflects the hump-shaped pattern predicted by the
screening model, indicating that informal sector jobs play an important role by
screening young less-educated workers new to the labor market. Furthermore,
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the estimation results reject the traditional queuing model with heterogenous
workers’ abilities, indicating that informal sector jobs provide some value above
and beyond make-shift work while waiting to find a formal sector job.
Notice that this conclusion could break down if there is a third sector to
which discouraged workers move, i.e. nonparticipation. If discouraged infor-
mal sector workers move to nonparticipation, and those workers moving out
are mainly L-skilled workers, then the proportion of H-skilled workers would
increase, pushing the average hazard function up; since H-skilled leave the
informal sector at a faster rate, the proportion of H-skilled would decrease,
pulling the average hazard function down. This alternate mechanism would
produce a similar hump-shape pattern without employer learning. The ques-
tion is whether young workers entering the labor market are discouraged and
move to nonparticipation during the first years of their careers, which depends
on the outside options of these workers. These outside options could be limited
in developing countries like Mexico.
The employment survey used in this study is a rotating panel with a pe-
riodic follow-up, and so a significant fraction of the duration measures are
interval-censored. In addition, for a good share of the spells the starting time is
only known to fall within a twelve-month interval. These features of the data
required the application of techniques for interval-censored failure time data,
and a Monte Carlo study to investigate several alternatives for overcoming
coarseness of the starting time of job spells. The latter is presented in chapter
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4.
The parameters characterizing the employer learning process were inferred
to determine how fast employers learn about their workers’ abilities. The ex-
ercise suggests that employers learn about their workers’ abilities at a much
slower rate than that required by a government employment program, Be´cate.
This finding highlights the importance of a firm’s involvement in the recruit-
ment of workers participating in the program. In this way firms can minimize
expected firing costs by recruiting candidates with a good match quality. Firm
participation in the selection of candidates is allowed in the current format of
Be´cate.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Education Group
Years of Education
Variable [ 0 , 6 ) [ 6 , 9 ) [ 9 , 12 )
Age 21.18 20.48 20.75
Married 0.18 0.16 0.15
Monthly Earnings† 3385.70 3578.19 3424.24
MinimumWage‡
Zone A 0.09 0.11 0.14
Zone B 0.12 0.15 0.15
Zone C 0.79 0.74 0.71
Firm Size
1-5 0.64 0.61 0.60
6-20 0.25 0.27 0.25
21+ 0.11 0.13 0.15
Industry
Construction 0.45 0.33 0.23
Manufacturing 0.21 0.21 0.20
Commerce 0.12 0.15 0.21
Services 0.22 0.31 0.36
Family Head Status§
Formal Sector Job 0.10 0.16 0.22
Self-employed 0.13 0.11 0.12
Unemployed 0.02 0.01 0.02
Entrepreneur 0.06 0.07 0.09
Out of Labor Force 0.08 0.10 0.08
Number of Obs. 304 1,415 3,113
†Average monthly earnings in Mexican Pesos as of the 2nd half of De-
cember 2010. ‡Minimum wage by zone: A > B > C. §Employment
status of the family head, when the family head is different from the
individual in the sample.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Duration Data in the Sample (Number of Observa-
tions)
Type of Sample
Type of Interval Flow Stock 1† Stock 2‡ Total
1-month 0 134 0 134
2-month 2 13 0 15
3-month 91 679 0 770
4-month 0 5 0 5
5-month 23 0 0 23
6-month 670 0 0 670
7-month 10 0 0 10
12-month 0 0 19 19
14-month 0 0 8 8
15-month 0 0 257 257
16-month 0 0 1 1
Right-censored 1,199 1,284 566 3,049
Total 1,995 2,115 851 4,961
†Workers with job start in the current or previous calendar year. ‡Workers
with job start before the previous calendar year.
Table 3.3: Censoring in the Sample (Number of Observations)
Type of Sample
Flow Stock 1† Stock 2‡ Total
Uncensored 796 831 285 1,912
Unemployed 224 314 57 595
Another risk§ 412 279 185 876
Still working in IS 563 691 324 1,578
Total 1,995 2,115 851 4,961
§Mainly composed by self-employment, but also includes unpaid family work,
entrepreneurship, and out of the labor force. †Workers with job start in the
current or previous calendar year. ‡Workers with job start before the previous
calendar year.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Duration Data in Weeks
Years of Education
[ 0 , 6 ) [ 6 , 9 ) [ 9 , 12 )
Complete Duration
Mean 15.3 14.2 13.9
25th pctile 3.0 3.5 3.0
50th pctile 7.0 7.5 6.0
75th pctile 15.0 16.0 15.5
Elapsed Duration
Mean 16.8 16.0 16.3
25th pctile 2.0 2.0 2.0
50th pctile 5.0 6.0 6.0
75th pctile 23.0 22.0 22.0
Note: For the purposes of getting these summary statistics, we imputed
the interval-censored duration data using the midpoint in the interval.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Piecewise Constant Hazard
Years or Education
[ 0 , 12 ) [ 0 , 9 ) [ 9 , 12 )
Firm size 6-20 0.4315 0.4390 0.4297
(0.0553) (0.0978) (0.0675)
Firm size 21+ 0.7777 0.9284 0.7225
(0.0622) (0.1127) (0.0751)
Commerce Ind 0.2740 0.1316 0.3170
(0.0740) (0.1429) (0.0875)
Services Ind 0.0139 0.1722 -0.0353
(0.0653) (0.1176) (0.0790)
Construction Ind 0.0818 0.0792 0.0971
(0.0706) (0.1187) (0.0883)
Graduate Grade 6 0.0902 0.0745
(0.1066) (0.1076)
Graduate Grade 9 0.2915
(0.0544)
Married 0.2023 0.2942 0.1529
(0.0633) (0.1044) (0.0798)
Family Head FS 0.2426 0.3403 0.2078
(0.0554) (0.1058) (0.0650)
λ1 0.0223 0.0270 0.0296
(0.0040) (0.0075) (0.0055)
λ2 0.1915 0.1866 0.5241
(0.0293) (0.0434) (0.0916)
λ3 0.0671 0.0495 0.1331
(0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0216)
λ4 0.0379 0.0415 0.0564
(0.0057) (0.0096) (0.0084)
λ5 0.0387 0.0405 0.0543
(0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0069)
λ6 0.0320 0.0364 0.0443
(0.0041) (0.0062) (0.0048)
Log likelihood -3,838.71 -1,344.01 -2,478.97
Number of Obs. 4,961 1,825 3,136
The omitted industry is Manufactures and the omitted firm size is 1-5 em-
ployees. The covariates also include: (i) a variable summarizing the num-
ber of self-employment scholarships approved in the state of residence rel-
ative to the size of the state’s labor market, (ii) three dummies for the
year of start of the IS-Job (1997-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010),
the first category is omitted, and (iii) a dummy for adjusted duration mea-
sures. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 3.6: Estimated Weibull and Log-logistic Hazards
Weibull Log-Logistic
Years or Education Years or Education
[ 0 , 12 ) [ 0 , 9 ) [ 9 , 12 ) [ 0 , 12 ) [ 0 , 9 ) [ 9 , 12 )
Firm size 6-20 0.4347 0.4725 0.4170 0.6978 0.6481 0.7223
(0.0549) (0.0974) (0.0667) (0.0953) (0.1601) (0.1195)
Firm size 21+ 0.8160 0.9662 0.7661 1.1837 1.1744 1.1798
(0.0615) (0.1121) (0.0739) (0.1135) (0.1912) (0.1417)
Commerce Ind 0.2875 0.1530 0.3265 0.4092 0.1542 0.5446
(0.0734) (0.1422) (0.0865) (0.1313) (0.2385) (0.1592)
Services Ind 0.0133 0.2019 -0.0492 -0.0006 0.0940 -0.0353
(0.0649) (0.1172) (0.0783) (0.1150) (0.1941) (0.1432)
Construction Ind 0.0860 0.1043 0.0963 0.1795 -0.0372 0.3344
(0.0700) (0.1185) (0.0871) (0.1206) (0.1910) (0.1569)
Graduate Grade 6 0.0563 0.0418 0.1639 0.1060
(0.1063) (0.1073) (0.1684) (0.1716)
Graduate Grade 9 0.2826 0.5403
(0.0541) (0.0906)
Married 0.2153 0.3066 0.1624 0.4348 0.5557 0.3441
(0.0627) (0.1039) (0.0789) (0.1112) (0.1781) (0.1427)
Family Head FS 0.2676 0.3529 0.2380 0.3665 0.4953 0.3167
(0.0549) (0.1053) (0.0642) (0.0975) (0.1793) (0.1166)
α 0.8630 0.8865 0.8539 1.6445 1.5083 1.7236
(0.0247) (0.0454) (0.0294) (0.0451) (0.0736) (0.0573)
T ∗ 5.73 5.96 5.49
Log likelihood -4,022.24 -1,385.59 -2,626.72 -4,011.19 -1,401.62 -2,598.79
Number of Obs. 4,961 1,825 3,136 4,961 1,825 3,136
The omitted industry is Manufactures and the omitted firm size is 1-5 employees. The covariates also include: (i) a
variable summarizing the number of self-employment scholarships approved in the state of residence relative to the size
of the state’s labor market, (ii) three dummies for the year of start of the IS-Job (1997-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-
2010), the first category is omitted, and (iii) a dummy for adjusted duration measures. T ∗ was computed using x = x¯.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure 3.5: Piecewise Constant Baseline Hazard with 95% Pointwise Confi-
dence Interval
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Figure 3.6: Estimated and Model-Generated Hazards
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NOTE: The model-generated hazard uses µ¯ = 0.05, µ(pL) = 0.0495, µ(pH ) =
1.0, φ = 0.4833, and σ = 0.1478. The estimated hazard uses (λˆ1, . . . , λˆ6) from
the first column Table 3.5 and exp(x¯′ρˆ) = 1.57.
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Chapter 4
Stock Sampling with
Interval-Censored Elapsed
Duration: A Monte Carlo
Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The length of time that individuals spend in a certain state, for example em-
ployment, is often at the center of applied studies in economics. Broadly speak-
ing, there are two ways of obtaining duration data for this sort of study. One
way is to sample individuals who enter the state of interest at some point dur-
ing a fixed period of time. This sampling scheme is known as flow sampling
(Wooldridge, 2002). Alternatively, the researcher can sample individuals who
are already in the state of interest at a certain point in time. This sampling
scheme is known as stock sampling (Wooldridge, 2002). Both sampling schemes
are valid for inference, but the researcher must account for the type of sampling
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in the estimation.
Ultimately, the researcher will use the sampling scheme that is more suit-
able for the study, and the one that is available in the data. Depending on the
state of interest, flow sampling may require the fixed period of time to be long
enough in order to observe a sufficient number completed spells.1 In such a
case, stock sampling may be more appropriate, since it only requires the re-
searcher to follow the individual for a fraction of his or her spell in order to
know the complete duration of the spell, given that the researcher knows the
starting point of the spell.
This paper focuses on a stock sampling scheme in which individuals who
are already in a particular state are sampled at a given point in time, say t0.
At the sampling date, the length of time spent in the state of interest up to
t0 is recorded. This measure is called elapsed duration. After the sampling
date, individuals are followed for a fixed period of time, and the length of time
spent in the state after t0 is recorded. This measure is called residual duration.
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) refer to this sampling scheme as delayed entry;
Lancaster (1990) refers to it as observation over a fixed interval (see chap. 8,
sect. 3.1); and Wooldridge (2002) refers to it as stock sampling. The current
study follows the convention of calling it stock sampling.2
1An observed spell is said to be complete if both the beginning and the end of the spell are
observed. Spells in which only the beginning is observed, but not the end, are called right-
censored spells. Spells in which only the end is observed, but not the beginning, are called
left-censored spells.
2Lancaster (1990) and Murphy (1996) call stock sampling a scheme in which only the
elapsed duration of the individuals in the sample is observed, but there is no follow up of
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Figure 4.1 describes the aforementioned sampling scheme. Note that short
spells that started and ended before the sampling date, such as T1, are not
sampled, whereas, for sampled spells, such as T2, the complete duration is the
sum of the elapsed and the residual duration. Figure 4.1 illustrates a well
known feature of stock sampling, that it produces a truncated sample because
some spells are not observed. This is typically referred to as left truncation
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; Wooldridge, 2002), and the bias generated as
length-biased sampling, because long spells are more likely to be sampled than
short spells (Kiefer, 1988; Lancaster, 1990).
Figure 4.1: Stock Sampling
- Calendar time
t0
Sampling
Date
Stop
Follow-up
s sT1
Not
Observed
s sT2
Elapsed
Duration
Residual
Duration
In order to account for left truncation in a stock sample, the likelihood func-
tion must incorporate the fact that long spells are sampled systematically more
often. Let T be a random variable with density f(t|x), representing the dura-
tion of the event of interest, where x is a set of time-invariant covariates, and
let T˜ be a spell in the stock sample. Similarly, let s be the starting time of the
event of interest and t0 the stock sampling date, so that the elapsed duration
the individual after the sampling date (see Lancaster, 1990, chap. 8, sect. 3.3).
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is e = t0 − s. Then, in the stock sample, T is only observed if T > e. In other
words, T˜ = T | T > e, and so the density of T˜ is given by:
g(t˜|x) = f(t|x, T > e) =
f(t|x)
Pr{T ≥ e|x}
. (4.1)
It is evident from (4.1) that knowledge of the starting time of the event is
crucial for accounting for left truncation in a stock sample. This result is
well known in the literature, e.g. Wooldridge (2002), Klein and Moeschberger
(1997), Lancaster (1990), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
This paper addresses a further complication in the stock sampling scheme
that has not been addressed in the literature and that arises in some socioeco-
nomic surveys. The stock sampling scheme in this paper is identical to the one
described above with the difference that, for some spells, the starting time is
only known to be contained within some interval. Let t0 be the stock sampling
date, and let tc < t0 be some date such that, if tc < s < t0, then s is observed,
but if s < tc, then, only an interval [S
L, SR] containing s is observed. Equiva-
lently, for spells that started after tc, the elapsed duration e is observed, but for
spells that started before tc, it is only known that e is contained in the interval
[EL, ER].3
Figure 4.2 describes the sampling scheme that this paper explores. For
spells that started before tc, such as T1, the starting time is only known to be
contained in an interval (interval [SL1 , S
R
1 ] in the picture), whereas, for spells
3Note that this problem is not as severe as left-censoring, in which the starting time, and
hence the elapsed duration, is not known at all.
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that started after tc, such as T2, the exact starting time is observed (s2 in the
picture). Note that the density of observed spells in this sample is different
from (4.1) because for some spells, e is only known to be contained in the inter-
val [EL, ER].
Figure 4.2: Stock Sampling with Interval-Censored Starting Time
- Calendar time
tc t0
Sampling
Date
Stop
Follow-up
[ ]
sT1
s sT2
SL
1
SR
1
s2
This sampling scheme is common when obtaining job duration data from
surveys that are implemented as rotating panels. Two examples are the Na-
tional Survey of Occupation and Employment fromMexico, ENOE (its acronym
in Spanish), and theMonthly Employment Survey from Brazil, PME (its acronym
in Portuguese). Both surveys have been used in studies of duration of employ-
ment in Mexico (see Chapter 3) and in Brazil (Ulyssea and Szerman, 2006).
The PME provides the exact elapsed duration if the respondent’s current job
started within the last two years, but only the number of years elapsed if the
job started more than two years before the interview. In the ENOE, the start-
ing time of the job is known if the respondent’s current job started during the
previous calendar year, but only the starting year is known if the job started
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before the previous calendar year.
Table 4.1 shows that in both surveys the fraction of spells with interval-
censored elapsed duration or interval-censored starting times is significant. In
the ENOE, 72% of paid employees in the first quarter of 2010 started their
current jobs before the previous calendar year, and so the survey only records
the year when such a job started. In the PME, 60% of the paid employees
in January of 2012 started their current jobs more than two years before the
interview, and so the survey only records the number of years elapsed since the
job started.
Table 4.1: Elapsed Duration in the ENOE and PME
Elapsed Duration ENOE PME
Num. Obs. % Num. Obs. %
Exact 20,499 27.37 12,875 39.51
Interval-Censored 54,399 72.63 19,713 60.49
Total 74,898 32,588
Source: INEGI for ENOE, IBGE for PME. Data from the ENOE is for the first quarter of
2010. Data from PME is for January of 2012. The table only includes paid employees.
As Table 4.1 suggests, spells with interval-censored elapsed duration can-
not be ignored. The goal of this study is to investigate different alternatives for
overcoming this coarseness by imputing the interval-censored elapsed duration
and performing a Monte Carlo analysis to gauge the properties of the estima-
tors, focusing on the unbiasedness of the estimators. The Monte Carlo analysis
is based on simulated duration data that resembles the sampling scheme of
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the ENOE, which is further explained below. The interval-censored elapsed
duration is imputed using: (1) the lower bound of the interval containing the
elapsed duration, (2) the midpoint of the interval, and (3) the upper bound
of the interval. The results indicate that using the midpoint to impute the
interval-censored elapsed duration outperforms the alternatives.
The study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the problem at
hand and a direct approach to overcome the coarseness of starting times. It
also describes the imputation methods as an alternative to the direct approach
for estimation. Next, in Section 4.3, the simulation algorithm is presented.
Section 4.4 presents the results from the Monte Carlo simulations and Section
4.5 presents an application of the imputation methods to duration data from
the ENOE. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Interval-Censored Starting Times
The problem of interval-censored starting times introduced in the previous sec-
tion can be addressed as one would address the problem of left-censoring (see
Wooldridge, 2002, exercise 20.8). Using the same notation as before, let T be
a random variable with density f(t|x; θ) representing the duration of the event
of interest, where x is a set of time-invariant covariates and θ is the vector of
parameters of interest characterizing the duration model. Let t0 be the stock
sampling date, and S the starting time of the event with density k(s|x; η), where
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η is the vector of parameters characterizing the distribution of S. Also, as be-
fore, the elapsed duration is defined as E = t0 − S, and the residual duration is
defined as U = T − t0 + S. Suppose that, conditional on the covariates x, start-
ing times are independent of the duration variable. Then, the joint density of
T and S is given by g(t, s|x; θ, η) = f(t|x; θ)k(s|x; η). Then, using the change of
variable technique, it is straightforward to show that the density of U is given
by:
h(u|x; θ, η) =
∫ SR
SL
f(u+ t0 − s|x; θ)k(s|x; η)ds. (4.2)
Next, suppose that, after t0, individuals in the stock sample are only fol-
lowed during a fixed interval of time C. Then, if U > C the spell will be right-
censored. Hence, the probability that the spell is right-censored is given by:
Pr{U > C|x} = 1−
∫ C
0
h(u|x; θ, η)du = 1−H(C|x; θ, η). (4.3)
Finally, to obtain the contribution to the likelihood function from a spell
with an interval-censored starting time, it is necessary to account for stock
sampling. For this, recall that a spell t in a stock sample is observed if and only
if t > t0 − S. Thus the probability that a spell with interval-censored starting
time is sampled is given by:
Pr{T > t0−S|x} = 1−
∫ SR
SL
∫ t0−z
0
g(t, s|x; θ, η)dtds =
∫ SR
SL
[
1−F (t0−s|x; θ)
]
k(s|x; η)ds.
(4.4)
Hence, the contribution to the likelihood from a spell with residual duration ui,
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and interval-censored starting time [SLi , S
R
i ], is given by:
Li(θ, η|xi) =
h(ui|xi; θ, η)
di
[
1−H(C|xi; θ, η)
](1−di)
∫ SR
i
SL
i
[
1− F (t0 − s|xi; θ)
]
k(s|xi; η)ds
, (4.5)
where di, is an indicator equal to 1 for completed spells and 0 for right-censored
spells. Hence with knowledge of k(·|·), it is possible to estimate the vector of pa-
rameters (θ, η). In many cases, the likelihood function will involve integrals for
the contribution of spells with interval-censored starting times. For example,
in the widely used case where T follows a Weibull distribution, and assuming
that S follows a uniform distribution in [SL, SR], the cumulative distribution
function of U at the right-censoring time is given by:
H(C|x;α, β) =
1
SR − SL
(∫ C
0
e− exp(x
′β)(u+t0−SR)αdu−
∫ C
0
e− exp(x
′β)(u+t0−SL)αdu
)
.
This has no closed-form solution. In such cases, the researcher can apply tech-
niques of numerical integration and proceed with the estimation of (θ, η). The
following section describes an alternative procedure to estimate θ by imputing
interval-censored starting times.
4.2.1 Alternative for Estimation: Imputed Starting Times
The previous section develops a methodology to estimate the parameter of the
duration model, θ. The methodology depends on the assumption that start-
ing times are independent of the duration variable, requires knowledge of the
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distribution of starting times, and involves no-closed form expressions.4 This
section explores an alternative for estimation of θ by imputing a missing start-
ing time using the interval which contains the starting time. Notice that this
method is equivalent to imputing the missing elapsed duration using the in-
terval that contains the elapsed duration. In what follows, the imputation
methods are discussed in terms of the elapsed duration.
Three imputation methods are explored, using: (1) the lower bound, (2)
the upper bound, and (3) the midpoint of the interval [EL, ER]. Let Eˆ be the
imputed elapsed duration, then, the imputation methods are:
1. Eˆ = EL
2. Eˆ =
EL + ER
2
3. Eˆ = ER
A fourth imputation method, which consisted in replacing the missing elapsed
duration with a random draw from the interval [EL, ER], was also considered.
The random draw was based on a uniform distribution on [EL, ER]. This impu-
tation method produced results very similar to the results using the midpoint
of the interval. Hence, only the results using the midpoint of the interval are
presented here.
4Alternatively, the assumption on independence could be relaxed and the distribution of
starting times could be nonparametrically estimated. This will make estimation even more
computationally demanding.
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Finally, the contribution to the likelihood of a spell with interval-censored
starting time is given by:
Li(θ|xi) =
f(tˆi|xi; θ)
di
[
1− F (eˆi + C|xi; θ)
](1−di)
1− F (eˆi|xi; θ)
(4.6)
where di is the indicator defined before, eˆi is the imputed elapsed duration,
tˆi = u + eˆi is the imputed duration, and F (·|·) is the cumulative distribution of
T . The parameters from the duration model, θ, can be estimated by maximum
likelihood.
The question is when do we want to impute the elapsed duration instead
of using the exact likelihood to estimate the parameters of the duration model.
The choice will depend on the problem at hand. The main advantage of imputa-
tions is the savings on computation time, which could be expensive in some set
ups. For example, in the case of continuous duration presented in the previous
section, the exact likelihood involves integrals with no closed form, in which
case the researcher will have to use Monte Carlo integration or quadratures.
Even though this is feasible, it could be computationally expensive. Similarly,
in the case of discrete duration, evaluating the exact likelihood could be com-
putationally expensive if the duration variable has a non-trivial portion of ob-
servations with a fine measure of duration, e.g. weeks, and so the researcher
would like to use the finest possible measure. That is, suppose that some of
the duration measures are known up to the week, and for some durations with
interval-censored starting times the duration is only known to be contained in
a 52-week interval. In that case, we know that the true duration could be one
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of the 52 possible durations, which implies computing the likelihood 52 times
(because it is the union of mutually exclusive events: week 1, week 2, . . ., or
week 52). Again, this could be computationally expensive. The goal of this pa-
per is to explore the properties of the estimators when using imputed measures
in the likelihood instead of the the exact likelihood.
The present paper performs a Monte Carlo analysis to explore the finite-
sample performance of the estimator under each of the three imputation meth-
ods. The simulated duration data resembles the duration data obtained from
surveys like the ENOE or PME. The simulation algorithm is described in the
following section.
4.3 Simulation of Survey Data
This section explains how the duration data are simulated. Since the simu-
lation exercise is done to explore different alternatives to address the prob-
lems faced when working with duration data obtained from surveys such as
the ENOE or the PME, the simulation is tailored to match the features of du-
ration data obtained from these surveys. In particular, this paper focuses on
employment duration data obtained from the ENOE. The simulation algorithm
to obtain the continuous-time duration data is explained in the next section.
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4.3.1 Simulation Algorithm
A continuous-time data set is generated first. This data set is used later to gen-
erate different data sets with interval-censored starting times. The continuous-
time data are obtained assuming that T follows a Weibull-Gamma distribution,
with a hazard function given by:
λ(t|x, ν) = µαtα−1ν, (4.7)
where α is the measure of duration dependence; µ is a scale parameter, which
is parameterized as µ = exp{β0 + β1x} to account for observed heterogeneity;
and the parameter ν represents unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed
to be distributed Gamma(κ, δ) with density:
g(ν) =
1
Γ(κ)
δκνκ−1e−δν ,
so that E[ν] = κ/δ and Var[ν] = κ/δ2. The cumulative distribution function of T
conditional on ν is given by:
F (t|x, ν) = 1− exp{−µtαν}. (4.8)
The distribution of ν is normalized by setting E[ν] = 1, which implies setting
κ = δ, consequently Var[ν] = 1/δ. As a result, small values of δ imply that
a large portion of the variation in the duration variable is due to unobserved
heterogeneity, whereas large values of δ imply that unobserved heterogeneity
is only responsible for a small fraction of the variation in the duration variable.
When δ grows indefinitely, the distribution of T converges to a Weibull distri-
bution without unobserved heterogeneity (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
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In the literature, duration data is usually simulated assuming that that
these data arise from a flow sampling scheme (e.g. Ridder, 1987; Heckman and
Singer, 1984; Baker and Melino, 2000), but this paper is mainly interested
in a stock sampling scheme. To generate stock sampling data the duration
data are simulated in the same way as a renewal process. The description of
the renewal process presented below is based on the description provided by
Lancaster (1990).
Refer to Figure 4.3. Let the subindex i identify a sequence of generations of
individuals with the same observable and unobservable characteristics, and let
the subindex j identify a particular member of a given sequence, so that the du-
ration tij refers to the duration of member j from the sequence of generations of
individuals i. Suppose that a population of workers starts employment at some
time t = 0. Consider a sequence of generations of individuals with observable
and unobservable characteristics (xi, νi). Each member of the population in the
first generation is employed for a random period of time Ti1 with distribution
F (t|xi, νi) and realization ti1. When a member of the first generation exits the
state of employment, this member is replaced with another member (the second
generation) who is employed for a random period of time Ti2 with distribution
F (t|xi, νi) and realization ti2. This process repeats indefinitely. Stock sampling
takes place at some time t = t0. In Figure 4.3, two hypothetical generation se-
quences of the simulated population are sampled. At the stock sampling date,
t0, the first sequence is in its seventh generation, while the second sequence is
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in its fourth. At the stock sampling date, the elapsed duration of each mem-
ber is e1 and e2, and their residual duration is u1 and u2, and so the sampled
employment spells are t1 = e1 + u1 and t2 = e2 + u2.
Figure 4.3: Simulation as a Renewal Process
-
6
t = 0
t21 t22 t23 t24
t11 t12 t13 t14 t15 t16 t17
t0
e2 u2
e1 u1
t2 = e2 + u2
t1 = e1 + u1
For each sequence of generations i, the stock sample data generation uses
the following steps:
1. Draw xi from a N(µx, σ
2
x), to obtain µi = exp{β0 + β1xi}.
2. Draw νi from a Gamma(δ, δ) distribution.
3. Start with j = 1, compute the duration spell tij as follows:
(a) Draw Y from a Uniform[0,1].
(b) Compute tij using the inverse of the cumulative distribution function
(4.8) as follows:
tij = F
−1(Y |xi, νi) =
[
−
ln(1− Y )
µiνi
]1/α
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4. Compute the cumulative duration for the sequence of spells up to gener-
ation j: T ij =
j∑
k=1
tik.
5. If T ij > t0, then stop and go to 6, otherwise go back to 3, increase j by 1,
and repeat process.
6. Once the stock sampling date is reached, compute the residual, the elapsed,
and the complete duration, respectively, as:
u∗i = T ij − t0
e∗i = T ij − u
∗
i
t∗i = e
∗
i + u
∗
i
This process is repeated for i = 1, 2, . . . , 3000, that is the sample size is N =
3, 000. Notice that the draw of the observed and unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponents, xi and νi respectively, is done only once for each sequence of genera-
tions of the population and stays constant during the repeated draws from the
uniform distribution Y .
Six different sets of parameters of the data generating process were chosen.
These parameter sets account for every combination of three cases of duration
dependence with two cases of unobserved heterogeneity. The three cases of du-
ration dependence are: (1) negative duration dependence, α < 1; (2) no duration
dependence, α = 1; and (3) positive duration dependence, α > 1. The two cases
of unobserved heterogeneity are: (1) no unobserved heterogeneity, large value
of δ; and (2) unobserved heterogeneity, small value of δ. The scale parameter, µ,
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is chosen to match the observed stock-sample average duration in the informal
sector from the ENOE in weeks, which is 82.12 weeks. Since µ = exp{β0+β1x},
the parameter used to match the survey data is β0, while β1 is set to β1 = 1.
The parameter β0 is chosen using the simulated samples without unobserved
heterogeneity. The same value of β0 is used for the samples with unobserved
heterogeneity, so that the only difference between two samples with the same
degree of duration dependence is in the value of δ.
Only one covariate x is considered. The same covariate is used for all sim-
ulated samples and for all six parameter sets. This covariate is drawn from
a N(µx, σ
2
x). The mean of this distribution is set to µx = 0, and its variance is
set to σ2x = 0.25. The choice of variance follows Baker and Melino (2000): σ
2
x is
chosen so that the R2 from a regression of the simulated ln(T ) on the simulated
x is similar to the R2 of a similar regression using the duration data and a set
of covariates from the ENOE.5
The six parameter sets are presented in Table 4.2.
Generating Survey-like Samples
Once the continuous-time duration data have been generated, it is straight-
forward to generate samples with features similar to those of the ENOE. The
first feature is right-censoring. For spells with residual duration ui > C the
5The duration data from the ENOE contains some interval-censored spells. In order to fit
this regression, these spells are imputed as T˜i = Li + u · (Ri − Li), where u is drawn from a
uniform distribution in [0, 1] and (Li, Ri] is the interval containing the actual duration.
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Table 4.2: Parameters of Data Generating Process
Parameter Set β0 β1 α δ
1 -1.03 1 0.5 100
2 -1.03 1 0.5 1
3 -3.85 1 1.0 100
4 -3.85 1 1.0 1
5 -6.40 1 1.5 100
6 -6.40 1 1.5 1
residual duration is set equal to C, where C is a fixed right-censoring period
(equal to 52 weeks in the case of the ENOE). The second feature, and the object
of this paper, is interval-censored elapsed durations. For spells with starting
times before the previous calendar year (i.e. 52 weeks before the stock sam-
pling date), only the year when the spell started is known. For these spells, the
elapsed duration is only known to be contained in a 52-week interval [ELi , E
R
i ].
4.4 Simulation Results
A total of 100 continuous-time data sets, each of sizeN = 3, 000, were generated
for each parameter set using the algorithm and parameters presented in the
previous section. Using these continuous-time data sets two sample designs
were generated. These are described in Table 4.3.
Table 4.5 presents the estimation results using sample design CONTA but
ignoring stock sampling. That is, in the likelihood function (4.6), the term
in the denominator [1 − F (e∗i |xi; θ)] is ignored.
6 The table presents the true
6Note that in this case the denominator is in terms of e∗
i
, and not eˆi because in this sample
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Table 4.3: Sample Designs with Continuous-Time Data
Sample Design Residual Duration Elapsed Duration
CONTA ui = min{u
∗
i
, 52} ei = e
∗
i
CONTB ui = min{u
∗
i
, 52} If e∗
i
< 52⇒ ei = e
∗
i
If e∗
i
> 52⇒ [EL
i
, ER
i
] 52-week interval
parameter values, the average, and the standard deviation of the point esti-
mates using the simulated samples. It is evident from the table that ignoring
stock sampling severely affects the estimates of the parameters of the duration
model. The upward bias in α is linked to the downward bias in δ. The estimated
parameters indicate a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity even when this
feature is not present in the simulated data (recall that δ = 100 implies a low
degree of unobserved heterogeneity).
Table 4.6, on the other hand, presents the estimation results using sample
design CONTA and accounting for stock sampling. All estimates, with the
exception of the estimate of δ, include the true parameter value within one
standard deviation, indicating that the estimator is unbiased. The large value
of the estimate of δ for parameter sets 1, 3, and 5 results from the fact that
the likelihood function is relatively flat with respect to δ, and an estimate of
δˆ = 100 yields basically the same likelihood as an estimate of δˆ = 10, 000. In
such cases, the researcher may want to drop unobserved heterogeneity in the
model.
the “exact” elapsed duration is observed.
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From all six parameter sets, notice that, in the parameter set with negative
duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity (Parameter Set 2), the av-
erage estimate of α is: (i) the farthest away from the true α, and (ii) above the
true α. This result was noted by Baker and Melino (2000) for the case of the
non-parametric MLE. As they explain, it results from the fact that unobserved
heterogeneity can produce negative duration dependence, even when the latter
does not exist. Hence, when the optimization algorithm converges to a low es-
timate of δ, it converges to a large estimate of α, which is larger than the true
parameter. In addition, note that the estimates of β1 for this parameter set are
the farthest away from the true parameter, but no more than a standard devi-
ation away. The estimate for β0 in this parameter set, however, is downward
biased.
The results in Table 4.6 serve as a benchmark because the estimation ac-
counts for stock sampling when the elapsed duration is known exactly. Ta-
ble 4.7 presents the results from the estimation using sample design CONTB,
in which the elapsed duration is only known within a 52-week interval if the
elapsed duration is longer than a year. The estimation results suggest that the
three imputation methods yield satisfactory results for this case. Notice that
using Eˆ = EL usually yields estimates larger than using Eˆ = (EL + ER)/2,
which in turn also yields estimates larger than using Eˆ = ER. However, al-
most all estimates are very close to the true parameter values. Thus, if all that
is extraordinary in the data set is the interval-censoring of starting times, the
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numbers in the table suggest that using either of the three imputation meth-
ods will yield good estimates of the duration dependence parameters and the
coefficients on the covariates.
Notice that, for the Parameter Set 2, the estimates for β0 are downward
biased. However, this downward bias also occurs in the benchmark case in
Table 4.6, which has an “ideal data set”, and so interval-censored starting times
cannot be held responsible for this problem.
4.5 Duration Data in the ENOE
4.5.1 Duration of Informal-Sector Employment in the ENOE
The ENOE is a rotating panel in which households are followed over 12 months
with periodic visits every three months. Hence, the household is visited five
times over the course of a year. This survey is widely used in studies of the
informal sector as it provides the means to determine whether employed in-
dividuals belong to the formal or the informal sector (e.g. Chapter 3, Flores-
Vazquez, 2011). The informal sector is composed of all individuals holding a job
that does not comply with the labor regulations, e.g. social security, minimum
wage, severance pay.
Given the relevance of the ENOE for the study of the informal sector, this
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paper focuses on measures of employment duration in the informal sector be-
fore moving to the formal sector, that is, measures of the length of time that
passes between the point in time when an individual starts an informal sector
job and the point in time when such an individual gets a formal sector job.7
From the information collected by the ENOE, it is possible to sample individ-
uals who are already employed in the informal sector. Since the ENOE only
follows individuals over 12 months, if an employment spell has not yet finished
by the last interview, the spell is right-censored. In addition, if the employment
spell started before the previous calendar year, only the year when employment
started is observed.8
Figure 4.4 describes an example of an informal-sector employment spell con-
structed from the ENOE. In the first interview, the ENOE collects information
about the starting time of the informal sector job. This information is used
to construct the measure of elapsed duration, that is, the time elapsed from
the job start to the first interview (ei months in Figure 4.4). From the infor-
mation collected in the following visits, it is possible to construct a measure of
the residual duration, that is, the time elapsed from the first interview until
the individual gets a formal sector job (8 months in Figure 4.4). The complete
7In practice, an individual currently employed in the informal sector can “move” to the
formal sector within the same firm or with another firm. The data suggest that in the majority
of the transitions from the informal into the formal sector the individual changes firms.
8The ENOE only collects information about the starting time of the current job in the Long
Form of the ENOE which is answered at least once by each panel but not always in the first
visit to the household. The simulation exercise in the current study assumes that the long
form of the ENOE was answered in the first visit to the household.
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duration from the stock sample is the sum of the elapsed and the residual du-
ration (ei + 8 months in Figure 4.4). Finally, notice that if the respondent is
still employed in the informal sector by the fifth interview, the employment
spell will be right-censored, in which case it is only possible to know that the
informal-sector employment spell is larger than ei + 12 months.
Figure 4.4: Stock Sampling from the ENOE
-
Month→
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6
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Note: IS is and indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual holds an informal sector job. IS
= Informal Sector, FS = Formal Sector, ei = Elapsed Duration of individual i.
Under the best of circumstances, the information of the ENOE for each re-
spondent would include: (i) the exact number of months of elapsed duration,
ei, and (ii) the exact number of months of residual duration, ui. However, this
is not always the case. In many cases, the exact month when the respondent
makes a transition from the informal into the formal sector is not observed.
Using the example in Figure 4.4 again, it is known that, at the time of the
third interview, the respondent was employed in an informal sector job, and
that, by the time of the fourth interview, the respondent was employed in a for-
mal sector job. However, in many cases, the exact month of transition from the
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informal into the formal sector is not known.9 In such cases, the respondent’s
residual duration is interval-censored. In terms of Figure 4.4, the residual
duration is only known to be in the interval [6, 9) months. Consequently, the
complete duration in the informal sector is only known to be contained in the
interval [ei + 6, ei + 9) months, which includes the correct monthly measure of
complete duration, ei + 8 months.
4.5.2 Simulation Results
Three additional sample designs were generated to explore the properties of
the estimators under each imputation method when using duration data like
those provided by the ENOE. These additional sample designs are described in
Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Sample Designs with Interval-Censored Data
Sample Residual Duration Elapsed Duration
INTCA (Li, Ri] 13-week interval ei = e
∗
i
INTCB (Li, Ri] 13-week interval If e
∗
i
< 52⇒ ei = e
∗
i
If e∗
i
> 52⇒ [EL
i
, ER
i
] 52-week interval
INTCC (Li, Ri] 13-week interval If e
∗
i
< 52⇒ [EL
i
, ER
i
] 4.3-week interval
If e∗
i
> 52⇒ [EL
i
, ER
i
] 52-week interval
NOTE: Right-censored spells have residual duration in the interval [52,∞).
9This could result for many reasons. One of them is because the respondent made the
transition within the same firm, and so there is no actual recollection of the time when the
respondent started the formal sector job, because for the practical purposes it is the same job
for the respondent. Another reason is due to the fact that the Long Form of the ENOE is not
used in all five interviews, and the information about the start of a job is not available then.
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Each of the sample designs in Table 4.4 have interval-censored residual
duration, but differ in how the elapsed duration is observed. Sample design
INTCC is the one that resembles the duration data from the ENOE more
closely. Since the continuous-time duration data is generated to “mimic” weekly
data, if all that is known is the number of months of elapsed duration, then it is
known that the exact elapsed duration is contained in a 4.3-week interval. On
the other hand, if all that is known is the number of years of elapsed duration,
then it is known that the exact elapsed duration is contained in a 52-week in-
terval. Samples designs INTCA and INTCB are provided to introduce each of
these features one at a time and to be able to gauge the effect on the estimates
of each of these features.
The estimation results using simulated sample from the INTCA design are
presented in Table 4.8. The results in the table indicate that interval-censoring
of residual duration does not affect the properties of the estimators. The esti-
mation results are almost as good as the results when using the continuous-
time data presented in Table 4.6. Next, Table 4.9 presents the results using
simulated samples from the INTCB design. Once again, the estimation results
using either of the three imputation methods are quite satisfactory. In most
cases, the true parameter is not further than one standard deviation from the
average point estimate. As is usually the case, in Parameter Set 2, the true pa-
rameters are more difficult to recover. A similar difficulty arose when using the
continuous-time data presented in Table 4.7, hence interval-censored residual
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duration is not responsible for this problem.
Finally, Table 4.10 presents the more realistic and interesting case, sample
design INTCC, in which the elapsed duration is measured in months or years
and the residual duration is interval censored. Sample design INTCC is the
one that most closely resembles the duration data generated from the ENOE
as described in section 4.5.1. For this sample, all measures of residual duration
are only known to be contained in a 13-week interval (0,13], (13,26], (26,39],
and (39,52], except for those that are right-censored, which are also interval-
censored in the interval (52,∞). On the other hand, all starting times are
also interval-censored. For spells that started during the previous calendar
year, the starting time is only known to be contained in the 4.3-week interval.
For spells that started before the previous calendar year, the starting time is
only known to be contained in a 52-week interval. The estimation results,
presented in Table 4.10, indicate that using the midpoint in the interval to
impute the missing elapsed duration yields the best estimates of β1 and α,
which are usually the parameters in which the researcher is most interested.
Once again, the estimates for β0 are rather poor.
4.6 Final Remarks
This paper explores an alternative for estimation of a duration model when
the data is obtained from a stock sample and the starting times of the spells
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are only known to be contained in an interval. A direct approach for estima-
tion in this case involves “integrating-out” the missing starting times. This
approach requires assumptions about the distribution of starting times and,
in most cases, involves non-closed forms in the likelihood function that would
require the use of numerical integration. The alternative is to simply impute
the missing starting times using the information provided by the interval that
contains them. Since this paper is interested in the finite sample properties of
the estimated parameters under each imputation method, it provides a Monte
Carlo analysis to explore these properties. The property of interest is the unbi-
asedness of the estimator, particularly for the duration dependence parameter
and the coefficients on the covariates.
The results indicate that, if the researcher has access to continuous-time
duration data and interval-censored starting times are the only unusual fea-
ture of the data, then using either the lower bound, the upper bound, or the
midpoint of the interval produces unbiased estimates. However, in the case
which arises in commonly used surveys where the elapsed duration is mea-
sured in months or years, the results indicate that using the midpoint outper-
forms the alternatives.
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results Ignoring Stock Sampling (Sample CONTA)
β0 β1 α δ
True PS 1 -1.03 1 0.5 100
-4.9745 2.7852 1.2328 0.9169
(0.1268) (0.1668) (0.0437) (0.1117)
True PS 2 -1.03 1 0.5 1
-4.0924 2.6463 1.2876 0.1442
(0.1196) (0.2819) (0.0558) (0.0092)
True PS 3 -3.85 1 1 100
-7.8336 2.0223 1.7462 1.5258
(0.1983) (0.1276) (0.0531) (0.2234)
True PS 4 -3.85 1 1 1
-8.2289 2.2136 2.0740 0.1645
(0.2930) (0.2595) (0.0942) (0.0105)
True PS 5 -6.4 1 1.5 100
-10.0088 1.6351 2.1664 3.0210
(0.2708) (0.1228) (0.0678) (0.7348)
True PS 6 -6.4 1 1.5 1
-11.1958 1.8945 2.6151 0.2090
(0.3909) (0.2438) (0.1078) (0.0156)
NOTE: “True PS” refers to the true parameter set, see Table 4.2.
Average point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthe-
sis, from the simulation samples. Estimation using the continuous-
time data set.
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Table 4.6: Estimation Results Accounting for Stock Sampling (Sample CONTA)
β0 β1 α δ
True PS 1 -1.03 1.00 0.5 100
-1.0661 1.0394 0.5174 3.40E+06
(0.1273) (0.1267) (0.0329) (8.83E+06)
True PS 2 -1.03 1.00 0.5 1
-0.0319 1.2571 0.5838 2.2542
(0.1853) (0.3404) (0.0712) (0.4550)
True PS 3 -3.85 1.00 1.0 100
-3.9300 1.0348 1.0247 2.29E+06
(0.1929) (0.1112) (0.0453) (6.25E+06)
True PS 4 -3.85 1.00 1.0 1
-3.2741 1.0332 1.0398 1.8546
(0.2755) (0.2108) (0.0794) (0.2878)
True PS 5 -6.4 1.00 1.5 100
-6.4053 0.9992 1.5064 3.20E+06
(0.2425) (0.1041) (0.0559) (6.77E+06)
True PS 6 -6.4 1.00 1.5 1
-5.9423 0.9988 1.5170 1.6518
(0.3631) (0.1831) (0.0935) (0.2366)
NOTE: “True PS” refers to the true parameter set, see Table 4.2. Av-
erage point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthesis,
from the simulation samples. Estimation using the continuous-time
data set.
1
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results with Imputed Elapsed Duration (Sample CONTB)
Imputation β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ
Parameter Set 1 Parameter Set 3 Parameter Set 5
-1.03 1 0.5 100 -3.85 1 1 100 -6.4 1 1.5 100
EL -1.03 1.08 0.51 1.8E+06 -3.93 1.04 1.03 9.9E+25 -6.58 0.99 1.55 2.4E+06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.04) (4.8E+06) (0.20) (0.11) (0.05) (9.9E+26) (0.28) (0.11) (0.06) (4.5E+06)
E
L
+E
R
2
-1.07 1.03 0.52 3.7E+06 -3.93 1.04 1.02 5.3E+29 -6.35 0.99 1.49 3.0E+06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (7.9E+06) (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (5.3E+30) (0.25) (0.11) (0.06) (5.7E+06)
ER -1.12 1.00 0.52 6.6E+06 -3.93 1.03 1.02 3.1E+13 -6.18 1.00 1.45 4.2E+26
(0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (9.0E+06) (0.18) (0.11) (0.04) (3.1E+14) (0.26) (0.11) (0.06) (4.2E+27)
Parameter Set 2 Parameter Set 4 Parameter Set 6
-1.03 1 0.5 1 -3.85 1 1 1 -6.4 1 1.5 1
EL -0.03 1.42 0.63 1.86 -3.30 1.11 1.07 1.59 -5.97 1.03 1.53 1.46
(0.19) (0.38) (0.08) (0.35) (0.31) (0.23) (0.09) (0.28) (0.40) (0.19) (0.11) (0.24)
E
L
+E
R
2
-0.03 1.23 0.57 2.35 -3.27 1.02 1.03 1.92 -5.94 1.00 1.52 1.69
(0.18) (0.33) (0.07) (0.48) (0.27) (0.21) (0.08) (0.29) (0.36) (0.18) (0.09) (0.24)
ER -0.01 1.07 0.52 2.97 -3.19 0.94 1.00 2.35 -5.87 0.96 1.49 1.98
(0.18) (0.30) (0.06) (0.66) (0.24) (0.19) (0.06) (0.32) (0.33) (0.17) (0.08) (0.25)
NOTE: Average point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthesis, from the simulation samples. Estimation using the continuous-time data
set.
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results with Interval-Censored Residual Duration (Sam-
ple INTCA)
β0 β1 α δ
True PS 1 -1.03 1.00 0.5 100
-1.0936 1.0517 0.5246 5.66E+06
(0.1830) (0.1387) (0.0468) (2.36E+07)
True PS 2 -1.03 1.00 0.5 1
-0.2180 1.4543 0.6624 1.9859
(0.4183) (0.4418) (0.1484) (0.5450)
True PS 3 -3.85 1.00 1.0 100
-3.9526 1.0388 1.0299 1.79E+06
(0.2029) (0.1134) (0.0489) (9.89E+06)
True PS 4 -3.85 1.00 1.0 1
-3.3158 1.0390 1.0518 1.8259
(0.3216) (0.2108) (0.0905) (0.3207)
True PS 5 -6.4 1.00 1.5 100
-6.4050 0.9996 1.5063 1.90E+06
(0.2537) (0.1058) (0.0584) (7.42E+06)
True PS 6 -6.4 1.00 1.5 1
-5.9403 1.0000 1.5163 1.6548
(0.3808) (0.1836) (0.0977) (0.2385)
NOTE: “True PS” refers to the true parameter set, see Table 4.2. Av-
erage point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthesis,
from the simulation samples. Estimation using the continuous-time
data set.
1
4
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Table 4.9: Estimation Results with Interval-Censored Residual Duration and Imputed Elapsed Duration
(Sample INTCB)
Imputation β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ
Parameter Set 1 Parameter Set 3 Parameter Set 5
-1.03 1.00 0.5 100 -3.85 1.00 1.0 100 -6.4 1.00 1.5 100
EL -1.03 1.09 0.51 1.1E+06 -3.96 1.04 1.03 8.3E+09 -6.54 0.98 1.54 7.4E+08
(0.21) (0.15) (0.06) (3.9E+06) (0.21) (0.12) (0.05) (8.3E+10) (0.35) (0.11) (0.08) (7.1E+09)
E
L
+E
R
2
-1.11 1.05 0.53 1.9E+10 -3.95 1.04 1.03 5.6E+05 -6.35 0.99 1.49 7.5E+05
(0.17) (0.13) (0.04) (1.9E+11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.05) (1.7E+06) (0.26) (0.11) (0.06) (1.8E+06)
ER -1.17 1.02 0.54 5.9E+06 -3.95 1.04 1.03 1.2E+06 -6.16 1.00 1.45 7.3E+06
(0.18) (0.12) (0.04) (2.3E+07) (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (3.7E+06) (0.26) (0.11) (0.06) (6.4E+07)
Parameter Set 2 Parameter Set 4 Parameter Set 6
-1.03 1.00 0.5 1 -3.85 1.00 1.0 1 -6.4 1.00 1.5 1
EL -0.25 1.78 0.75 1.59 -3.35 1.13 1.08 1.56 -5.93 1.02 1.52 1.49
(0.51) (0.54) (0.20) (0.48) (0.38) (0.23) (0.11) (0.32) (0.46) (0.20) (0.12) (0.31)
E
L
+E
R
2
-0.21 1.40 0.65 2.08 -3.31 1.02 1.05 1.89 -5.94 1.00 1.52 1.69
(0.40) (0.42) (0.14) (0.57) (0.31) (0.21) (0.09) (0.32) (0.38) (0.18) (0.10) (0.24)
ER -0.12 1.13 0.56 2.78 -3.22 0.94 1.00 2.33 -5.87 0.96 1.49 1.98
(0.34) (0.34) (0.11) (0.79) (0.27) (0.19) (0.07) (0.34) (0.35) (0.17) (0.09) (0.26)
NOTE: Average point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthesis, from the simulation samples. Estimation using monthly, interval-censored
residual duration and interval-censored elapsed duration for spells that started more than 52 weeks before the stock sampling date.
1
4
3
Table 4.10: Estimation Results Monthly and Interval-Censored Duration Data: Imputed Elapsed Duration
(Sample INTCC)
Imputation β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ β0 β1 α δ
Parameter Set 1 Parameter Set 3 Parameter Set 5
-1.03 1 0.5 100 -3.85 1 1 100 -6.4 1 1.5 100
EL -1.71 1.22 0.66 4.09E+05 -3.93 1.04 1.03 2.74E+08 -6.34 0.98 1.50 1.47E+10
(0.14) (0.15) (0.05) (3.1E+06) (0.18) (0.11) (0.04) (2.7E+09) (0.26) (0.10) (0.06) (1.1E+11)
E
L
+E
R
2
-1.04 1.07 0.52 7.83E+10 -3.96 1.04 1.03 3.48E+06 -6.35 0.99 1.49 1.68E+08
(0.36) (0.31) (0.11) (7.8E+11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.05) (2.5E+07) (0.26) (0.11) (0.06) (1.7E+09)
ER -0.76 1.00 0.47 5.63E+06 -3.97 1.04 1.03 1.12E+06 -6.33 1.00 1.48 2.98E+05
(0.14) (0.11) (0.02) (1.3E+07) (0.22) (0.11) (0.05) (3.7E+06) (0.28) (0.11) (0.06) (8.4E+05)
Parameter Set 2 Parameter Set 4 Parameter Set 6
-1.03 1 0.5 1 -3.85 1 1 1 -6.4 1 1.5 1
EL -1.23 1.25 0.90 1.23 -3.33 1.05 1.06 1.61 -5.65 0.99 1.46 1.58
(0.25) (0.35) (0.13) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.08) (0.27) (0.37) (0.19) (0.10) (0.25)
E
L
+E
R
2
0.26 1.73 0.58 1,273.661† -3.31 1.03 1.05 1.89 -5.95 1.00 1.52 1.69
(0.66) (0.63) (0.21) (12,711.35) (0.32) (0.21) (0.09) (0.33) (0.39) (0.19) (0.10) (0.25)
ER 3.50 1.52 0.43 277,464.3‡ -3.20 0.99 1.01 2.28 -6.12 0.99 1.54 1.89
(8.63) (5.15) (0.32) (1,393,749) (0.33) (0.20) (0.09) (0.38) (0.47) (0.19) (0.11) (0.35)
NOTE: Average point estimates and their standard deviation, in parenthesis, from the simulation samples. Estimation using monthly, interval-censored
residual duration and interval-censored elapsed duration for spells that started more than 52 weeks before the stock sampling date.
† The large value in this average is because for one sample the estimated δ was very large. Taking the average over the remaining 99 samples gives an
average of 2.53 (with a standard deviation of 1.25).
‡ The large value in this average is because for 25 samples the estimated δ was very large. Taking the average over the remaining 75 samples gives an
average of 3.57 (with a standard deviation of 2.37).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Even though the idea of accumulation of human capital in the informal sector
has been suggested in previous studies, no study has attempted to verify this
possibility. Chapter 2 provides evidence and arguments that suggest that in-
formal sector jobs might indeed provide training opportunities for young less-
educated workers. Chapter 3 goes further in trying to understand the role
informal jobs play in the careers of less-educated workers. In addition to the
role of informal jobs as providers of training opportunities, this chapter also
investigates a second role that is rarely mentioned in the literature: the role
of informal jobs as a screening mechanism that allows employers to learn the
skills of young less-educated workers.
The research strategy followed in Chapter 3 is to build a model of the infor-
mal and formal sectors that can separately accommodate two roles of informal
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jobs: human capital accumulation and screening. Each of these models pro-
duces different implications on the shape of the hazard function from the in-
formal to the formal sector. These differences in the hazard function are used
to determine whether informal sector jobs play the role of skill formation or
screening in the early careers of less-educated workers. The estimated haz-
ard function is consistent with the implications of the screening model, which
indicates that the informal sector has an important role by screening young
less-educated workers entering the labor market. It is stressed that his result
does not rule out the provision of human capital in the informal sector.
Finally, the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 required exploration of the
finite-sample properties of the estimators of the hazard functions when the
data do not have the properties required by estimation methods suggested in
the literature. It is argued that this departure from the typical stock sampling
data occurs often in practice, and for this reason, this problem cannot be ig-
nored. The problem in the data is that the exact starting times of spells are
not always observed. Instead, only an interval containing the exact starting
time is observed. Chapter 4 provides a Monte Carlo analysis to explore the
finite-sample properties of estimators using different methods to impute the
interval-censored starting time. The results from the Monte Carlo analysis
indicated that using the mid-point of the interval yields satisfactory results
when working with duration data obtained from surveys that are implemented
as rotating panels, such as the one used in the empirical analysis of Chapter 3,
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hence these were used in the empirical analysis of that chapter.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Wage Imputations
The information on earnings and working hours collected by the ENEU refers
to the job held during the week previous to the interview, which is called the
reference week. However, if the respondent did not attend work during the
reference week, this information is missing. This section explains the method-
ology and criteria used in this paper to impute the respondent’s earnings and
working hours when they are missing.
If the respondent was absent from work during the reference week, but
stated to have a job, then the ENEU proceeds to determine why the respondent
did not attend work. Some of the reasons why the respondent might have
been absent from work are: vacation, sickness and recovery, strike, lack of
production inputs, and work season ended. In such cases, the ENEU collects
information on usual earnings and usual working hours. The information on
usual earnings and usual working hours is used in this paper to impute the
missing earnings and working hours only when the respondent declared to be
absent from work due to vacation or due to sickness and recovery. Then, this
information is used to compute a measure of usual hourly earnings, which in
turn is used to impute the missing hourly earnings.
Finally, only those measures of usual earnings that satisfy certain criteria
are used to impute the missing hourly earnings. The criteria is to compare the
148
measure of usual hourly earnings against hourly earnings from the previous
and subsequent interviews, and to impute missing hourly earnings whenever
the measure of usual hourly earnings are within one standard deviation from
the previous, or the subsequent, measure of hourly earnings. The standard
deviation is obtained with respect to the hourly earnings observations of each
respondent. About 1% of the measures of hourly earnings in the final sample
are the imputed hourly earnings.
As mentioned in the description of the sample, the top and bottom 1% of the
hourly earnings are dropped from the sample. Only after the top and bottom
1% are dropped are missing hourly earnings imputed.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Wages in the Model
The surplus sharing rule implies that:
wF (x, p) is such that: WF (x, p)− U(p) =
β
1− β
[
JF (x, p)− VF
]
wI(p) is such that: WI(p)− U(p) =
β
1− β
[
JI(p)− VI
]
where in equilibrium, free entry implies that VF = 0 and VI = 0.
Wages in the Baseline Model:
wF (x, p) = β
(
px− δD
)
+ (1− β)r˜U(p)
wI(p) = βpI + (1− β)
(
r˜U(p)− βm(θF )
∫ 1
Q(p)
SF (s, p)dG(s)
)
Wages in the Human Capital Model:
wF (x, p) = β
(
px− δD
)
+ (1− β)
(
r˜U(p)− κ
[
U(pH)− U(p)
])
wI(p) = βpI + (1− β)
(
r˜U(p)− κ
[
U(pH)− U(p)
]
− βm(θF )
∫ 1
Q(p)
SF (s, p)dG(s)
)
150
Wages in the Learning Model:
wF (x) = β
(
p¯x− δD − σφΓL(x)D
)
+ (1− β)
(
r˜U − σ[φU(pL) + (1− φ)U(pH)− U ]
)
wI = βpI+(1−β)
(
r˜U − σ[φU(pL) + (1− φ)U(pH)− U ]− βm(θF )
∫ 1
Q
SF (x)dG(x)
)
B.2 Proofs
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note that SI(p) =
JI(p)
1− β
. In the proof we replace SI(p) with JI(p)/(1−β) in (3.9).
Consider the following result which proves to be useful in the proof of Lemma
1.
Lemma 2. An upper bound for
[
Q(p)−C(p)
]
is
r˜ + δ
r˜ + δ + µ(p) +m(θI)β
(
pI − z
p
)
.
Proof. First, note that:
JI(p) =
1− β
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(
pI − r˜U(p) +m(θF )
∫ 1
Q(p)
[WF (x, p)− U(p)]dG(x)
)
<
1− β
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(
pI − r˜U(p) +m(θF )
∫ 1
C(p)
[WF (x, p)− U(p)]dG(x)
)
=
1− β
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(
pI − z −m(θI)[WI(p)− U(p)]
)
=
1− β
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(
pI − z −m(θI)
β
1− β
JI(p)
)
And so, JI(p) <
1− β
r˜ + δ + µ(p) + βm(θI)
(pI − z). SinceQ(p)− C(p) =
(
r˜ + δ
p
)
JI(p)
1− β
,
the result follows.
Next, we proceed to prove Lemma 1.
151
Proof. Note that once we substitute equilibrium wage equations and use the
surplus sharing rules to substitute for unknown value functions, equations
(3.1), (3.8), and (3.9) represent a system of three equations with three un-
knowns and one parameter:
F (r˜U, C,Q; p) = 0. (B.1)
Note that we treat Ω = (δ, pI , m(θI), m(θF ), r, z,D, β) as given because Ω does not
change when the parameter p changes. Linearizing (B.1), we get:
(1− A)d(r˜U) + (N + AK)dC + (A(L− E))dQ− (AH +M)dp = 0
−
1
p
d(r˜U) + dC +
C
p
dp = 0
Bd(r˜U) + (BK − 1)dC + (1 +B(L−E))dQ−
(
BH −
Q− C
p
)
dp = 0
where:
A =
mIβ
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
, K =
µ(p)β
r˜ + δ
p,
B =
r˜ + δ
p(r˜ + δ + µ(p))
, L =
mFβ
r˜ + δ
p(Q− C)g(Q),
E = mF g(Q)
JI
1− β
, M =
mFβ
r˜ + δ
∫ 1
C
(x− C)dG(x),
H =
mFβ
r˜ + δ
∫ 1
Q
(x− C)dG(x), N =
mFβ
r˜ + δ
p[1−G(C)]
Note that for ease of exposition we denoted m(θj) = mj for j ∈ {F, I}. By
the Implicit Function Theorem and using Cramer’s rule, we can derive dC/dp,
which is given by:
dC
dp
=
A(L− E)(Q− C) + pB(L− E)(M − C) + pA(H − C) + p(M − C)
p
[
(L− E)(BN + A+ pB) + AK + Ap+N + p
] .
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It is straightforward to show that all the terms in the numerator, except for the
second one, are negative. Ignore the third term, which we know is negative,
then adding the first, second, and fourth terms in the numerator, and after
some algebra, we get:
p
(
δD + z
p
)[
mF (1− β)
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(Q− C)g(Q)− 1
]
−
mIβ
r˜ + δ
p(Q− C)
which is negative if the term in square brackets is negative. Using Lemma 2
to bound the term in square brackets from above we get:
[
mF (1− β)
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
(Q− C)g(Q)− 1
]
<
(
r˜ + δ
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
)(
(1− β)mF g(Q)
r˜ + δ + µ(p) +mIβ
)(
pI − z
p
)
−1.
Notice that because µ(p) > 0, we can further bound the term on the right hand
side of the inequality from above. Then, a sufficient condition for the numerator
to be negative is that:
(
(1− β)mFg(Q)
r˜ + δ + µ(p) +mIβ
)(
pI − z
p
)
< 1.
Let η =
1
1− β
(
pL
pI − z
)
. Rearranging this condition we get:
mF
(
g(Q)− η[1−G(Q)]
)
< η(r˜ + δ) + ηmIβ.
Finally, since mI > 0, mF < 1, and Q ∈ [0, 1], a stronger condition that does not
depend on endogenous variables is:
∀x ∈ [0, 1]
(
g(x)− η
∫ 1
x
g(u)du
)
< η(r˜ + δ) (CDN 1)
Since the third term is negative, (CDN 1) is a sufficient condition for the nu-
merator to be negative. Now, we focus on the denominator of dC/dp. It is
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straightforward to show that (L − E)(BN + A + pB) < 0, and using Lemma 2
again, we can bound from above the absolute value of the this term:
∣∣∣(L−E)(BN+A+pB)
∣∣∣ < g(Q) mF (1− β)(pI − z)
r˜ + δ + µ(p) +mIβ
[
mIβ +mFβ[1−G(Q)] + r˜ + δ
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
]
.
(B.2)
The other term in the denominator is positive and it is given by:
(AK +Ap+N + p) = p
[(
mIβ
r˜ + δ + µ(p)
)(
µ(p)β + r˜ + δ
r˜ + δ
)
+
mFβ[1−G(C)]
r˜ + δ
+ 1
]
.
(B.3)
Next, we compare (B.2) and (B.3). Using the sufficient condition (CDN 1) we
can show that p > g(Q)
mF (1− β)(pI − z)
r˜ + δ + µ(p) +mIβ
, so the outer term is higher for (B.3).
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the term in square brackets is also
higher in (B.3) than the term in square brackets in (B.2), so that the denomi-
nator is positive. As a result, dC/dp < 0.
Now, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem and use Cramer’s rule again
to derive dQ/dp, which is given by:
dQ
dp
=
pB
[
H(N + p)−M(K + p) +C(K −N)
]
+ p
[
(M −Q) +A(H −Q)
]
+ (N +AK)(C −Q)
p
[
(L− E)(BN +A+ pB) +AK +Ap+N + p
] .
We already proved that under certain parameter conditions the denomina-
tor of dQ/dp is positive. Then it just remain to show that the numerator is
negative. It is straightforward to show that the second and third terms of the
numerator are negative. To show that the first term is negative, note that
M > H so:
pB[H(N + p)−M(K + p) + C(K −N)] < pB[M(N + p)−M(K + p) + C(K −N)]
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= pB[MN −MK + C(K −N)]
= pB(N −K)[M − C]
< 0
where the last inequality from the fact that C > M . As a result, dQ/dp < 0.
And this completes the proof.
B.2.2 Proofs of the Shape of the Unconditional Hazard
Rates
Before proving Propositions 2, 4, and 6, consider the following result about the
unconditional hazard rate. The proof of Lemma 3 follows the arguments of ?,
chap. 4.
Lemma 3. Let λ(t|p) be the hazard rate conditional on worker skill level, and
λ′(t|p) = ∂λ(t|p)/∂t. Let φI be the probability that p = pL in the informal sector.
Then, the unconditional hazard rate and its derivative are given by:
λ(t) = γ(t)λ(t|pL) + [1− γ(t)]λ(t|pH)
λ′(t) = γ′(t)
[
λ(t|pL)− λ(t|pH)
]
+ γ(t)λ′(t|pL) + [1− γ(t)]λ
′(t|pH)
where γ(t) = 1
1+η(t)
, η(t) =
(
1−φI
φI
)
e−[Λ(t|pH)−Λ(t|pL)], Λ(t|p) =
∫ t
0
λ(s|p)ds, and η′(t) =
η(t)
[
λ(t|pL)− λ(t|pH)
]
.
Proof. The conditional survivor function is given by S(t|p) = e−Λ(t|p). Then, the
unconditional survivor function is given by S(t) = φIe
−Λ(t|pL) + (1 − φI)e
−Λ(t|pH ),
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and the unconditional hazard is given by λ(t) = −d lnS(t)/dt, then by the First
Fundamental Theorem of Calculus:
λ(t) =
φIλ(t|pL)e
−Λ(t|pL) + (1− φI)λ(t|pH)e
−Λ(t|pH)
φIe−Λ(t|pL) + (1− φI)e−Λ(t|pH )
= γ(t)λ(t|pL) + [1− γ(t)]λ(t|pH)
and
γ(t) =
φIe
−Λ(t|pL)
φIe−Λ(t|pL) + (1− φI)e−Λ(t|pH )
=
1
1 + η(t)
η(t) =
(
1− φI
φI
)
e−[Λ(t|pH)−Λ(t|pL)],
so that η(t) > 0. λ′(t) is straightforward and applying the First Fundamental
Theorem of Calculus again we have:
η′(t) = η(t)[λ(t|pL)− λ(t|pH)].
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 we have that:
η′(t) = η(t)[µ(pL)− µ(pH)] < 0,
γ′(t) = −γ(t)2η(t)[µ(pL)− µ(pH)] > 0, and
λ′(t) = γ′(t)[µ(pL)− µ(pH)] < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 we have that:
η′(t) = η(t)(1− κ)t
[
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
]
< 0,
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γ′(t) = −γ(t)2η(t)(1− κ)t
[
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
]
> 0, and
λ′(t) = γ(t)(1− κ)t[µ(pL)− µ(pH)]
2
[
ln(1− κ)
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
− γ(t)η(t)(1− κ)t
]
,
where each term in the square brackets is positive. However, the first term in
the square brackets is constant while the second one decreases with time. To
see this, define Φ(t) = γ(t)η(t)(1− κ)t, then it is easy to check that
Φ′(t) =
η′(t)
[1 + η(t)]2
(1− κ)t +
η(t)
1 + η(t)
(1− κ)t ln(1− κ) < 0
where negativity follows from η′(t) < 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1). Evaluating Φ(t) at t = 0
we find that Φ(0) = 1− φI , therefore:
(i) if ln(1− κ)/[µ(pL)− µ(pH)] > (1 − φI), then the term in square brackets is
always positive, and
(ii) if ln(1− κ)/[µ(pL)− µ(pH)] < (1 − φI), then the term in square brackets is
initially negative, but becomes eventually positive, so that λ(t) decreases
initially, but eventually increases.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Proposition 5 we have that
η′(t) = η(t)[1− (1− σ)t]
[
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
]
< 0
γ′(t) = −γ(t)2η(t)[1− (1− σ)t]
[
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
]
> 0, and
λ′(t) = −γ(t)2η(t)[1− (1− σ)t]2
[
µ(pL)− µ(pH)
]2
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+ (1− σ)t ln(1− σ)
[
µ¯− φµ(pL)− (1− φ)µ(pH)
]
.
Note that in the definition of η(t) in Lemma 3, φ replaces φI . Inspection of λ
′(t)
reveals that for low values of t, the second term dominates but it is eventually
overtaken by the first term, much more faster the higher σ is. Next, evaluating
λ′(t) at t = 0, we find
λ′(0) = ln(1− σ)
[
µ¯− φµ(pL)− (1− φ)µ(pH)
]
.
Therefore, if the term in square brackets is:
(i) Positive, then the hazard is monotonically decreasing.
(ii) Negative, then the hazard increases initially, but eventually decreases.
B.3 Minimization Algorithm to Find Parameters
of the Employer Learning Model
The estimated hazard suggest starting values for
(
µ¯, µ(pL), µ(pH)
)
. In partic-
ular, by Condition 3, Q(pH) < Q < Q(pL), and so µ(pL) < µ¯ < µ(pH). This is
because at t = 0 the hazard must equal µ¯ and for longer durations the hazard
must equal µ(pL). However, the estimated hazard in Figure 3.5 suggests that
Q ≈ Q(pL). Then, we set µ(pL) = 0.99 · µ¯, so that µ(pL) is arbitrarily close to, but
below µ¯, and use exp(x¯′βˆ)λˆ1 = 0.03 as a starting value for µ¯. Similarly, we know
that µ(pH) must be higher than the maximum of the hazard function, then we
use exp(x¯′βˆ)λˆ2 = 0.3 as a starting value for µ(pH). The estimated hazard does
not provide much information to select starting values for (σ, φ). Hence we use
different starting values given by {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} for each parameter. This
gives a total of 25 different starting values, in all cases we use T = 50. For all
starting values, the resulting vector of parameters is: µ¯ = 0.05, µ(pL) = 0.0495,
µ(pH) = 1.0, φ = 0.4833, and σ = 0.1478.
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